



PEPPERDINE
POLICY REVIEW

Articles

**Educating Citizens:
*Have We Kept the Founders' Ideals
for Higher Education?***
Hans Zeiger

**Is Going Yellow Really Going
Green?**
*A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Ethanol
Production in America*
Michelle Isenhouer

**Mental Health Care in India:
*Prescribing the Right Policy***
Kimberly Meltzer

**Going All In:
*The Gamble of Globalization &
European Economic Integration***
Lauren S. Koffs

Alumni Feature

**Standing Up for Charity:
A Book Review of Who Really Cares
by Arthur C. Brooks**
*Alumnus Jeffrey M. Jones of
the Hoover Institution*

Commentary

**Poking the Russian Bear:
*The European Missile Defense
Shield***
Jeremy Anderson

**Corporate Environmentalists:
*Green Business Strategy***
Danielle Bersen

**Barack Obama:
*Same Story, New Character***
Jonathan Freinberg



PEPPERDINE POLICY REVIEW

Pepperdine Policy Review is a student-run journal that showcases the best scholarly work of School of Public Policy students at Pepperdine University. It features articles, commentaries, and book reviews that address a variety of important issues.

The mission of *Pepperdine Policy Review* is to publish the best scholarly research, innovative policy solutions, and insightful commentary that School of Public Policy students have to offer. This journal seeks to inform policy makers, academic researchers, and the general public of ideas that will help transform public policy debate in the U.S. and abroad. All articles are thoroughly reviewed by student editors and must meet rigorous academic standards.

Articles published in *Pepperdine Policy Review* do not necessarily reflect the views of the Editorial Board or the School of Public Policy. The journal is published annually and accepts submissions from current students and alumni of the School of Public Policy.

EDITORIAL STAFF

Editor-in-Chief

Matthew C. Piccolo

Managing Editor

Karla Saia

Publishing Editor

Pooja Jhobalia

Editors

Jonathan Freinberg

Daniel Himebaugh

Lauren S. Koffs

Kimberly Meltzer

Ryan Peterson

Erika Reynolds

Nicolas Valbuena

Brian Vo

Faculty Advisor

Dr. James Priege

Contact

Pepperdine Policy Review

School of Public Policy

Pepperdine University

24255 Pacific Coast Highway

Malibu, CA 90263-7490

(310) 506-7490

pepperdinepolicyreview@gmail.com

[http://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/](http://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/policy-review/)

[policy-review/](http://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/policy-review/)

Contents

7 **Message from the Editor**

[Articles]

11-15 **Educating Citizens:
Have We Kept the Founders' Ideals for Higher
Education?**
Hans Zeiger

17-27 **Is Going Yellow Really Going Green?
A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Ethanol Production in
America**
Michelle Isenhouer

29-43 **Mental Health Care in India:
Prescribing the Right Policy**
Kimberly Meltzer

45-52 **Going All In:
The Gamble of Globalization and European Economic
Integration**
Lauren S. Koffs

[Alumni Feature]

57-61 **Standing Up for Charity
A Book Review of Who Really Cares by Arthur C.
Brooks**
Jeffrey M. Jones of the Hoover Institution

[Commentary]

63-67 **Poking the Russian Bear:
The European Missile Defense Shield**
Jeremy Anderson

69-72 **Corporate Environmentalists:
Green Business Strategy**
Danielle Bersen

75-79 **Barack Obama:
Same Story, New Character**
Jonathan Freinberg

Message from the Editor

Soon after beginning my studies in Malibu, I knew that the School of Public Policy (SPP) needed a student policy journal. I hoped that a journal would not only provide a forum for student ideas, but also continue to raise the high standard of scholarship and writing at the school this year and for many to come. With that goal in mind, I pestered Dean Wilburn for months to convince him that the class of 2008 possessed the intellect and initiative to make the journal a success. He eventually gave in and we went to work.

After months of careful planning and meticulous editing, we present to our readers the fruits of our labors in the inaugural volume of *Pepperdine Policy Review*. I believe that the fruits are good. The articles reflect the school's aims to help students design and implement policy solutions that are rooted in wisdom of ages past, are guided by moral and ethical principles, and are not limited to government solutions.

The journal includes four academic articles that highlight the extensive breadth and depth of scholarship at SPP. Jeffrey M. Jones's book review features the sort of interesting and notable work in which SPP alumni are engaged worldwide. And three SPP students offer fascinating commentaries that provide astute observations concerning some of the most pressing issues of our day and set forth policy recommendations to address them.

This first volume presents some of the most insightful analysis SPP students have to offer. It sets a solid precedent for future volumes and commences what I hope will become a remarkable tradition of excellence at SPP.

I gratefully acknowledge the diligent effort of the many students, staff and faculty who helped produce this journal. I thank Dean Wilburn for giving us a chance to succeed, Sheryl Kelo for her endless patience and dedicated service, Dr. James Prieger for his wise counsel and, above all, the authors and editorial staff for their diligent work, particularly Nicolas Valbuena for his loyal support throughout the project. Please enjoy the inaugural volume of *Pepperdine Policy Review*!

Matthew C. Piccolo
Editor-in-Chief

[articles]

**Educating Citizens:
Have We Kept the Founders' Ideals
for Higher Education?**

**Is Going Yellow Really Going Green?
A Cost-Benefit Analysis of
Ethanol Production in America**

**Mental Health Care in India:
Prescribing the Right Policy**

**Going All In:
The Gamble of Globalization and
European Economic Integration**

Educating Citizens: Have We Kept the Founders' Ideals for Higher Education?

By HANS ZEIGER

Engraved above the colonnade of the Angell Building at the University of Michigan are the words of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787: "Religion, morality, and knowledge, being necessary to good government and the happiness of mankind, schools and the means of education shall forever be encouraged" (*Northwest Ordinance*). The irony of this inscription is that religion and traditional morality are not highly regarded at the University of Michigan. The University of Michigan was one of the major outposts in the campus wars of the 1960s, the legacy of which is a campus culture of multiculturalism, sexual obsession, and political correctness. Not even knowledge is prevalent in the postmodern university, if by knowledge we mean an integration of the disciplines into a coherent reality. Instead, we witness a fragmented world of deconstruction and trivial pursuits where the black perspective, the gay perspective, or the female perspective takes the place of a single reality. Each perspective is weighted by a political agenda (typically to the left), and professors, many of them having come of age with the protests of the 1960s, unload politics into the classroom.¹ Though higher education is more politicized than ever, it is doing little to prepare students for responsible engagement in politics. Since there is no shared philosophy about "religion, morality, and knowledge," we may ask whether "good government" is still possible.

Indeed, in a republic, civic duty begins with education. "In the United States, the sum of men's education is directed toward politics," Alexis de Tocqueville observed in *Democracy in America* (292). Such a statement would have thrilled many of the founders, who hoped that educational institutions, especially at the university level, would be aimed toward the cultivation of republican civic duty. In their rhetoric about higher education, the founders were careful to shape the discussion around the political demands of the new republic. This article will demonstrate that the founders cared deeply about higher education as the means to prepare the rising generation of American leaders. We may analyze today's university in light of the founders' ideal.

Institutional education in the early agrarian republic was not widespread, and college education was rare. Before the revolution, the colonies could boast but nine colleges, all of them small and some unstable (Rudolph, *Essays on Education* xvii). In the colonial setting, higher education was directed mainly toward the training of ministers and Christian gentlemen (Pangle, 146).

¹ Some readings on this topic include Allan Bloom's *Closing of the American Mind* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), Martin Anderson's *Impostors in the Temple: A Blueprint for Improving Higher Education in America* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1996), Alan Charles Kors and Harvey A. Silverglate's *The Shadow University: The Betrayal of Liberty on America's Campuses*, and Roger Kimball's *Tenured Radicals* (New York: Harper and Row, 1990). Challenging many of these arguments is John K. Wilson's *The Myth of Political Correctness: The Conservative Attack on Higher Education* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1995).

With the revolution came a shift of political and vocational ambitions in higher education. A fresh spirit of American national identity and democracy gave rise to new colleges and to enthusiastic boosters of civic purpose in the mission of American higher education (Rudolph, *The American College* 34). Between 1782 and 1802, nineteen colleges that exist to this day were chartered in the states (35-36). Symbolic of the departure from Old World traditions, King's College changed its name to Columbia College in 1784 (43). According to Frederick Rudolph, there obtained in early America "a widely held belief that the colleges were now serving a new responsibility to a new nation: the preparation of young men for responsible citizenship in a republic that must prove itself, the preparation for lives of usefulness of young men who also intended to prove themselves." (*The American College* 43)

Not only did the colleges take interest in the founding of the republic, the founders were highly interested in the colleges. Awareness of the political possibilities in young America spurred on a discussion among the founders about the prospects for republican education. George Washington, James Madison, Noah Webster, and other founders were interested in the idea of a university. Several of the founders—Thomas Jefferson, John Witherspoon, Benjamin Rush, Benjamin Franklin—were directly involved in the founding or leadership of a college or academy. Less remembered intellectuals—Robert Coram, Simeon Doggett, Samuel Knox, Samuel Harrison Smith—contributed to a public discussion of educational theory.

Education was important to the founders because it was closely linked to republican self-government and duty. A recent historian, Eugene Miller, writes that "innovations in the forms and structure of government could not be made durable without attention also to the proper education of the citizenry" (71). In the founders' estimation, learning and liberty were inseparable. Benjamin Rush posited that "a free government can only exist in an equal diffusion of literature," and Thomas Jefferson considered that the surest prevention of tyranny was "to illuminate, as far as practicable, the minds of the people at large" (qtd. in Miller, 73-74). Both the head and the heart were involved in the founding view of educational purpose. Noah Webster declared, "Education, in a great measure, forms the moral characters of men, and morals are the basis of government." Some founders went further than others in their expectations of civic education. "Let our pupil be taught that he does not belong to himself, but that he is public property," Rush wrote in "Thoughts upon the Mode of Education Proper in a Republic" (14). Drawing on the examples of ancient Greece and Rome, Rush believed that rigidly disciplined and diligently instructed children could be fitted for dutiful citizenship.²

It was proper for government to promote education, since education was the means of promoting good government and happiness, a sentiment affirmed by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. In his 1797 "Remarks on Education" for the American Philosophical Society, the newspaper editor Samuel Harrison Smith listed three categories of benefits resulting from republican education. First, "The citizen, enlightened, will be a free man in its truest sense" (qtd. in Rudolph, *Essays On Education* 220). As a self-governing and virtuous individual, the citizen would know both his rights and his responsibilities. Second, the educated citizen would contribute to the political welfare of the country by his participation in its institutions and deliberations on the development of its political philosophy. In turn, finally, the nation would be an example to the world and "the most powerful nation on earth, if that example exhibit dignity, humility, and intelligence" (222-223).

² None of this was to exclude traditional liberal education. Against the opinion of thinkers from Cato to Rousseau that liberal education and democracy are fundamentally in opposition, the founders believed that "liberal education is fully compatible with republican civic education," according to Miller (Miller, 71, 82). Though liberal and civic education were not interchangeable, literary and scientific instruction rooted in the classics cultivated good intellectual habits, preparing the mind for "republican duties and virtues," while civic education went further to instruct youth in patriotic duty and moral virtue (Miller, 83-84).

Though education was not included in the Constitution, it was certainly a priority for the founders; where they differed was on the degree of government involvement in education. Since childhood education remained firmly a matter of local and private concern, discussions among the founders about state and federal educational establishment centered on higher education.

For many early state leaders, higher education was a priority. The North Carolina Constitution of 1776 decreed that “all useful learning shall be duly encouraged and promoted in one or more universities” (qtd. in Rudolph, *The American College* 36). Opening its doors less than two decades later, the University of North Carolina departed from the traditional liberal arts curriculum with courses in chemistry, agriculture, mechanic arts, belles lettres, and modern languages (41-42). Three other states—Georgia, Tennessee, and Vermont—established state universities by 1800 (36). In addition to founding the Presbyterian-affiliated Dickinson College, Benjamin Rush drafted his Pennsylvania “Plan for the Establishment of Public Schools” to include a single state university, which would draw young scholars from four colleges to the state capitol to study “law, physic, divinity, the law of nature and nations, economy, etc.” (Rudolph, *Essays on Education* 4). Temporarily, the state of Pennsylvania managed the University of Pennsylvania, while New York and New Hampshire respectively held temporary management of Columbia and Dartmouth (Rudolph, *The American College* 36).

Thomas Jefferson spent much of his life building a state university in his home of Virginia. Jefferson began his campaign to improve higher education as a professional visitor of his alma mater, the College of William and Mary. In 1779, Jefferson initiated administrative reforms at the college, hoping to enable academic change in conformity to the increasing demands of the growing nation (Pangle, 153). In this he failed. As early as 1800, Jefferson wrote to Joseph Priestly with his plans for the University of Virginia, which would be a community of full-time professors and students highly focused on the natural sciences (Hofstadter & Smith, 175-176). It was another eighteen years before Jefferson organized a committee on education at a tavern in Rockfish Gap. The committee devised a plan, which, with some modification, has become the comprehensive educational system Americans know to this day: local elementary schools for all children, secondary academies for vocational instruction, and a state university for the intellectual aristocracy. The university would be secular. Its program of study would include ancient and modern languages, mathematics, physico-mathematics, physics, botany and zoology, anatomy and medicine, government and political economy and history, municipal law, and Ideology (rhetoric, ethics, belles lettres, fine arts) (Slosson, 86-88).

For a minority of the founders, concern for civic higher education became the basis for suggesting a national public university. Benjamin Rush first proposed the idea in the January 1787 inaugural issue of *American Museum* magazine. The university would be something like a graduate school, following upon the completion of state-based colleges, emphasizing “everything connected with government” and “everything connected with defensive and offensive war” (qtd. in Pangle, 148). In radical distinction from the classically-based European colleges, “the youth of America will be employed in acquiring those branches of knowledge which increase the conveniences of life, lessen human misery, improve our country, promote population, exalt the human understanding, and establish domestic, social, and political happiness” (148). Fearing that bland ecumenical religion was harmful to genuine devotion, Rush thought it best to exclude religion from the national university altogether (148-149).

Later that year, the Constitutional Convention took up the idea of the university after Charles Pinckney proposed it. It was not adopted, in part because the federal city already had authority to establish such an institution, in part because of a conviction that universities were to be state institutions, not federal (Pangle 149). James Madison, who seconded Pinckney’s resolution, continued to advocate a national university for years, writing as president in 1810 that such an institution would promote patriotism, intellectual enlightenment, republican

manners and sentiments, mutual understanding, and “social harmony.” Most importantly, “it would contribute not less to strengthen the foundations than to adorn the structure of our free and happy system of government” (Hofstadter & Smith, 177).

President Washington was the most avid promoter of a national university. Increasingly, Washington feared that foreign influences and radical ideas would find their way into American politics by the tendency of upper class youth to study at European colleges. America’s republican integrity depended on a national institution dedicated to the teaching of “the arts, Science and Belles lettres” that would avoid the perils of foreign education. Further, a national university would promote national union “by assembling the youth from the different parts of this rising republic, contributing from their intercourse, and interchange of information, to the removal of prejudices which might perhaps, sometimes arise, from local circumstances” (Allen, 605-606).

In his First Annual Message to Congress in 1790, Washington explained that knowledge is the foundation of “public happiness,” especially in a republic. Education helped to secure “a free constitution” by teaching the principles of public confidence, rights and duties, the distinctions between just and oppressive authority, between liberty and license (Allen, 469). Washington asked Congress to investigate the place of education in the federal government. Without Congressional action by 1795, Washington offered his plan for a national university to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, promising fifty shares of navigation on the Potomac River if they could establish a university in the federal city (605-606).

At the end of his second administration, Washington made one last challenge to Congress to act on a national university plan. The preparation of the nation’s future leaders ought to be a priority, he indicated in his Eighth Annual Message. A national university would result in “the assimilation of the principles, opinions, and manners, of our countrymen, by the common education of a portion of our youth from every quarter.” By educating young men in “the science of *government*” regardless of their regional backgrounds, the “prospect of permanent union” would be real (Allen, 505). The nation’s rising statesmen would form deep friendships and learn the same ideas of political science from the world’s best teachers. As Washington wrote to Alexander Hamilton, young leaders in a community of learning “would by degrees discover that there was not that cause for those jealousies and prejudices which one part of the Union had imbibed against another part” (649). Not only liberty, but union also, was tied to the establishment of proper institutions of learning. In his Last Will and Testament, Washington endowed the fifty shares of Potomac navigation toward the establishment of the national university (670). The national university never came about.

Though discussion of a national university continued for decades, federal involvement in higher education was negligible until the passages of the G.I. Bill of 1944, the National Defense Education Act of 1958, and the Higher Education Act of 1965. In the early republic, the successes in government-sponsored universities were felt in the states. State university systems endure to the present.

This brings us back to the starting point of this article. The sad condition of many academic departments at most universities is that they have ceased to give allegiance to the “Great Tradition” of Western civilization that the American founders believed essential. Though higher education is more public than ever before, the actual underpinnings of the public good—what Walter Lippmann called “the public philosophy”—have become privatized to the smaller corners of the universities (*The Public Philosophy*). If one wishes to have an education in “religion, morality, and knowledge” these days, he must go off to a small liberal arts college or a traditional religious school.

Allan Bloom confronted these problems eloquently twenty years ago, in *The Closing of the American Mind*. Since America is not an aristocratic society, he wrote, “[t]he greatest of thoughts” are not and have never belonged exclusively to a narrow group of people in the upper

ranks of American society. Rather, “The greatest of thoughts were in our political principles but were never embodied, hence not living, in a class of men. Their home in America was the universities, and the violation of that home was the crime of the sixties” (Bloom, 321). The principles of liberalism, whether defined as the sort of education one must have to be free, or as ideas about liberty on which the nation was founded (the two, after all, are related), have had no greater opposition in the United States than what Dinesh D’Souza has called “illiberal education” (*Illiberal Education*).

The founding fathers believed deeply in the possibility of forming citizens, and they promoted a civic and moral education that would sustain American self-government. Religion, morality, and knowledge—comprising the public philosophy—are no less essential to public happiness and good government today than they were in 1787. Even if illiberal education has triumphed over liberal education, those of us who seek the public good may yet see to it that good education “shall forever be encouraged.”

Works Cited

- Allen, W.B., ed. *George Washington: A Collection*; Washington, to the Commissioners of the District of Columbia, 28 Jan. 1795. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 1988.
- Bloom, Allan. *The Closing of the American Mind*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988.
- D’Souza, Dinesh. *Illiberal Education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus*. New York: Free Press, 1991.
- Hofstadter, Richard and Smith, Wilson eds. *American Higher Education: A Documentary History*, Vol. I; James Madison, 1810. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961.
- Lippmann, Walter. *The Public Philosophy*. New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1992.
- Miller, Eugene F. *On the American Founders’ Defense of Liberal Education in a Republic*. The Review of Politics, Vol. 46, No. 1. Jan. 1984.
- Northwest Ordinance of 1787, 13 July 1787*. Avalon Project, Yale Law School 29 Mar. 2008. <<http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/nworder.htm>>
- Pangle, Lorraine S. and Pangle, Thomas. *The Learning of Liberty: The Educational Ideas of the American Founders*. Lawrence, KS: The University Press of Kansas, 1993.
- Rudolph, Frederick. *The American College and University: A History*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1962.
- Rudolph, Frederick, ed. *Essays on Education in the Early Republic*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press/Harvard University Press, 1965.
- Slosson, Edwin Emery. *The American Spirit in Education: A Chronicle of Great Teachers*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921.
- Tocqueville, Alexis de. *Democracy in America*, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000.

Is Going Yellow Really Going Green? A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Ethanol Production in America

By MICHELLE ISENHOUER

I. Introduction

The 2005 Energy Policy Act mandated the use of 7.5 billion gallons of renewable fuels by the gasoline industry annually by the year 2015. The United States has already achieved this modest goal. As a result of recent successes with ethanol, the new Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (House Resolution 6) has increased the goal to 36 billion gallons of renewable fuels to be in use by 2022. The goal of the legislation is to move the United States toward energy independence; however, the feasibility of reaching it in the given time period is widely debated. As a result of the difficulty of measuring new and innovative environmental policies, few cost-benefit analyses have been performed on alternative fuels. This article presents the debate surrounding ethanol becoming the main commercial alternative fuel through a qualitative cost-benefit analysis so as to better evaluate new energy policies.

II. Background Information

The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 refers specifically to three types of ethanol as the predominant biofuels, or alternative fuels, that the United States must use to reach the goals set by the bill. Ethanol is made from starchy crops such as sugar, corn, and wheat and broken down to alcohol that can be used as a fuel source for vehicles or electricity. Conventional ethanol in the United States is made from corn. Corn is the most abundant and fertile crop in America and corn ethanol is currently the “only biofuel in serious quantity” (Montenegro). The Energy Policy Act of 2005 helped to push corn ethanol production forward, causing an increase of nearly a billion gallons. This push for more biofuel usage in the United States has contributed to the 60 percent increase in corn prices since last September, giving farmers a boost and providing congressmen in the Corn Belt an incentive to go green (Yacobucci CRS-4).

Unfortunately, environmentalists contend that corn-based ethanol is the least environmentally friendly of the main alternative fuels. Corn is an energy intense crop and requires a great deal of either natural gas or fossil fuels to break it down into ethanol. Further, because it is a row crop that requires a large amount of fertilizer and pesticides it is also one of the more environmentally destructive crops. As a result of the amount of energy needed to grow corn and break it down into ethanol, the end benefit to the environment is much less than sugar based or cellulosic biofuels (Yacobucci CRS-12). This controversy over corn led the House of Representatives to limit the amount of corn ethanol that can be utilized to reach the goals set by HR 6. Corn ethanol production will increase until 2016 at which point all further increases in ethanol production to meet the 2022 goal must be met with advanced biofuels such as cellulosic ethanol (HR 6).

Sugar ethanol is another common type of ethanol used globally. Sugar ethanol is not widely in production in the United States but is the main form of renewable fuel for Brazil, which produces it more cheaply and efficiently than the United States produces corn ethanol (Montenegro). There is currently a tariff on Brazilian ethanol to protect the domestic corn ethanol market. In general, producing ethanol from sugar cane is less expensive than producing it from corn because the production process requires fewer steps. Corn must first be broken down into a starchy sugar and then broken down again to make the alcohol for fuel. Unfortunately, sugar cane ethanol production in the United States is not economical. The United States does not have the proper growing conditions for large-scale sugar crops and creating them artificially would be very expensive.

In terms of ethanol production, Brazil has mastered the market. Brazilian use of sugar-based ethanol has replaced more than 40 percent of their gasoline consumption and was still on the rise as of mid-2006 (Reel). Brazil has the right to claim reaching “energy independence” from their ethanol development (Reel). It is crucial to note, however, that “most of these policies were developed over decades, and mistakes were made,” in the process that helped Brazil arrive at the efficiency it has achieved today (Hester 13). The United States can learn from some of Brazil’s mistakes, but the most important lesson is that moving from an all-gasoline society to one that incorporates ethanol is a slow process that requires government support. Brazil began its process in the 1970s with subsidies and financial aid to its ethanol market and has only decreased these incentives in recent years now that the market has become strong on its own. Furthermore, now that it has attained energy independence, moving forward is an even slower process that will require detailed research into the positive and negative consequences of high levels of ethanol use (Hester 17).

The final type of ethanol addressed in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 is cellulosic ethanol. Cellulosic ethanol is made from the cell walls of starchy plants that store high levels of energy and can be broken down into ethyl alcohol. The plants used in the production of cellulosic ethanol are referred to as biomass. Biomasses that can be used for the production of cellulosic ethanol in the United States include switchgrass, poplar, willow, wood pulp, corn stock, among others (USDA). All forms of ethanol discussed yield approximately two-thirds the energy of gasoline, but cellulosic ethanol is three times more environmentally efficient (EIA), meaning it and other alternative energies do not harm the environment. There are many new alternative fuels, such as corn ethanol and liquid coal, whose production have serious negative impacts on the environment. Producing cellulosic biomass, however, does not require the fertilizer and pesticides that corn needs. As discussed later in this article, the costs of these chemicals to the environment are substantial. Cellulosic ethanol in its final form is chemically the same as conventional ethanol, but is made through a three-step process from biomass. Experts in the biofuels field are now beginning to point to cellulosic ethanol in increasing numbers as the answer to fulfilling America’s alternative fuel needs. Cellulosic ethanol, unlike corn ethanol, will not directly take away from the food market and is overall much more environmentally efficient. The new House Resolution 6 will require at least 16 billion gallons of the mandated 36 billion gallons to come from cellulosic biomass.

III. Literature Review

Today’s ethanol development is distinct from similar markets of the past. Cascone notes that “globally, biofuels developments are primarily driven by three fundamental policy considerations: rural development, energy independence, and a reduced carbon footprint” (95). The reduction of the carbon footprint is an unusual motivation for such large and broad policies globally and generally stems from the moral argument that societies must do something to combat global warming. Traditionally, changes that occur at a global level have related to po-

litical or territorial integrity and not to managing an economic ‘bad.’ Nevertheless, the push to reduce the carbon footprint of the United States, the world’s greatest polluter, is increasing (UNDP). Additionally, a very distinct aspect of the ethanol market is that “demand for biofuels is not driven by customers or economics, but by social and political issues” (Cascone 95). Cascone’s arguments are critical to remember when considering the costs of this new market in the cost-benefit analysis section that follows. When bringing together various sectors of society to create a new market forcibly, there will be significant costs in the early stages of market creation.

Currently in this line of research, Hahn and Cecot perform a cost-benefit analysis on ethanol use in America. They conclude in their research that, “the costs of increased production are likely to exceed the benefits by about three billion dollars annually” (2). Their paper provides an extensive quantitative review of the costs of ethanol production at an increasing rate from 4 billion gallons per year to 7 billion gallons per year (Hahn and Cecot 10). While there are serious costs there are also significant environmental benefits to the production and use of ethanol, such as lower emissions. The paper discusses the issues behind ethanol production in the United States, focusing mainly on corn ethanol while generalizing for ethanol across the board as well as comparing the production of corn ethanol in the United States to sugar ethanol in Brazil. Overall, the analysis is positive, but each type of ethanol is distinct and therefore cannot be generalized in this manner. This is the most common mistake people make when discussing ethanol, especially in America where ethanol is commonly thought of only in terms of corn ethanol—the least efficient biofuel. Even within corn ethanol production, the costs can vary depending on the energy source used to break down the corn into alcohol. While a good cost-benefit analysis must generalize across these variables it is important to address the nuances of the costs.

Even with all of the recent ethanol legislation and success stories from Brazil, the article by Hahn and Cecot concludes that further support for ethanol is not a certainty in the future (16). The costs, including subsidies for farmers, are too high when the benefits of corn ethanol are not monetarily or environmentally substantial after accounting for these production costs. In addition to production costs and subsidies, there are the costs of the ethanol tax credits in America. Tax credits and subsidies for corn ethanol cost U.S. tax payers \$2.47 billion annually. Furthermore, the tariffs that are in place against sugar ethanol from Brazil, in addition to the recent mandates declared by the administration, artificially keep prices higher (de Gorter and Just 12). Economics tells us that “this is because imports decline with a tariff, requiring an increase in domestic supply to fulfill the mandate” (de Gorter and Just 12). As a result, the prices of both ethanol and corn rise in America. Thus, from a market perspective, decreasing ethanol’s price would increase its demand and ability to compete with gasoline. However, increasing competition would also decrease corn prices which would harm farmers.

Overall, the demand for ethanol as a fuel additive is increasing and will continue to increase with coming years and increasing oil prices. The mandate for alternative fuels also increases the need to expand ethanol markets domestically. Hester concludes that the most efficient way to combat the increasing demand for ethanol is to integrate the ethanol market in the hemisphere by opening the American market to Brazilian sugar ethanol (WP10 2). Brazil does not have enough ethanol to export to American markets that could put corn ethanol or even the birth of cellulosic ethanol out of business. Thus, importing Brazilian ethanol will result in only positive consequences for the U.S. market by bringing the United States closer to oil independence but not to energy independence. Hester concludes that in addition to market integration, a successful ethanol market in the U.S. will also depend on technological improvements, which will include cellulosic ethanol (WP10 22). Hester’s arguments are compelling and supported by this article’s conclusions, as well as those of many experts in the field.

In another paper, Hester states that there is a “consensus among all stakeholders...

that priority must be given to the development of cellulosic ethanol” in order to address a growing need for both energy security and a solution to the alternative fuel mandate (TP1 6). This concept is essential in the analysis of the costs and benefits of ethanol; moving forward with new cellulosic technology will be challenging and costly but, once established, will be the most environmentally friendly and cost efficient fuel over time. Cellulosic ethanol does not affect the production of food like corn ethanol does. For example, feedstock demand for corn has increased the demand for corn for ethanol production, “from 14% of U.S. total corn production in 2005 to almost 20% in 2006” causing food shortages in the third world (Hester TP1 8). Etter from the *New York Times* adds that “opponents of ethanol also have hammered on an Agriculture Department projection that by 2010, less than 8% of the U.S. gasoline supply will come from corn-based ethanol - and 30% of the corn crop will be used to make it.” This further demonstrates the need for the United States to develop cellulosic ethanol.

III. Cost-Benefit Analysis

It is important to note that cost-benefit analyses have their own pros and cons, especially in the field of environmental politics. Kraft and Vig state that “the basic premise underlying benefit-cost analysis is that the purpose of economic activity is to increase the well-being of the individuals who make up society” (194). Goodstein maintains that one of the advantages of cost-benefit analyses is that it limits the amount of political manipulation that can occur. Typically, while the numbers may tell the real story, they can also be manipulated to suit political purposes; however, cost-benefit analyses are not as easily influenced by politicians or interest groups (Goodstein 201). Ethanol production and energy policy is a partisan issue and by relying on data from cost benefit analysis, political influence is held at a minimum. Kraft and Vig note, however, that “the temporal separation of costs and benefits creates perverse incentives to defer needed policy responses” (307). Nevertheless, Goodstein states that “at its best, a benefit-cost study will clarify the decision-making process” (190). Keohane and Olmstead make four very important points about cost-benefit analyses for environmental policy:

First, basing decisions simply on whether benefits outweigh costs omits important political and moral considerations....Second, discounting benefits that will occur in the distant future privileges current generations....Third, goods such as clean air...are devalued and cheapened when their worth is expressed in monetary terms. Finally, focusing on the net benefits to society as a whole ignores the identities of the winners and the losers... (45).

For these reasons cost-benefit analysis is predominantly conceptual and attempts to account for moral and ethical costs as well as externalities in order to provide a more accurate picture of the “true” costs and benefits of ethanol.

Another important feature of the following cost-benefit analysis is that much of this technology is in uncharted waters; there is very little past cost data measuring the effects of ethanol usage. Cellulosic ethanol has yet to hit the mainstream market or to be produced at a large-scale production plant for consumer purposes, and consequently has very little readily available cost data. The costs and benefits discussed below, therefore, are largely taken from data produced by experts from field experiments and is largely quantitative and not from consumer statistics.

Benefits

Currently, ethanol in America is produced primarily from corn sources. As such, most of the hard facts regarding the benefits of ethanol production are in regard to conventional corn ethanol. The benefits of corn ethanol are limited because of the large amounts of fertilizer necessary; however, corn ethanol may bring some positive consequences. First, as mentioned above, ethanol has brought increased wages and employment to most states in the Corn Belt, according to a recent economic analysis (Blanco and Isenhouer). The data shows statistically significant evidence that the promises of enhanced employment and wages made by the ethanol industry have proven true, yet the economic impact from corn ethanol has been minimal (Blanco and Isenhouer). Ethanol Across America, for example, is a grassroots non-profit organization that pushes the use of ethanol in America maintaining that there is a great deal economically that ethanol production can do for Americans at both the state and local levels in the form of increased wages, jobs, and economic stimulation. These sentiments are largely echoed by politicians in these Corn Belt states as justification for continuing growth of corn ethanol.

Ethanol production also brings industry to America when industries are leaving the United States for China. Iowa reports an increase of \$82.4 million in wages in 2005 alone (Ethanol Across America 6). While production is predominantly limited to the Corn Belt currently, the expansion of ethanol production and the rise of cellulosic ethanol will bring the industry to many regions in the United States. Currently, there are ethanol plants in states across the United States. There is a heavy concentration in the Corn Belt but ethanol has now managed to reach as far as the Southwest and the Southeast, in states such as California, Arizona, and Georgia. Additionally, the ethanol industry consumes a great deal of supplies and ingredients from other producers in the region of an ethanol plant. Ethanol Across America notes that the ethanol industry in Iowa has purchased more than \$161.6 million in ingredients from local businesses (6). Local and state governments do and will continue to receive tax money from these businesses. Therefore, in order to account for this, the monetary benefits of each ethanol plant will have to be calculated. The average amount of jobs provided and taxes paid will be multiplied by the number of plants for this year and the predicted number of plants for future years. These are solid measurable monetary benefits of ethanol production.

It is not only the production process that has proven beneficial to local communities, however. Corn prices in these Corn Belt states have increased from \$1.86 per bushel in 2005 to over \$4 per bushel in 2007, bolstering the earnings of small farmers of corn (Hargreaves). Despite the subsidies to farming, small farms are still not very profitable, and the ever-increasing corn prices are a blessing to the small farmer. Nonetheless, there are many mega-farms that also benefit extensively from rising corn prices. Most importantly, though, increasing corn prices have created a market for ethanol. Ethanol as a market is largely generated by legislation mandating its use and is not the result of demand for the product. With high corn prices, however, ethanol has found its market and is here to stay with the mandate and the new trend to “go green” as well as the desire of farmers to increase supply. It has opened the door to ethanol production and consumption as an alternative fuel to gasoline. This fact has huge consequences for the future of cellulosic ethanol and even other alternative fuels. Corn ethanol has succeeded in bringing alternative energy to the average consumer and opening the debate on alternative fuels wide open; America is going green by going yellow.

The future of ethanol now rests on the successes or failures of cellulosic ethanol since cellulosic ethanol is where the benefits of biofuels finally begin to outnumber the costs. The first major benefit of cellulosic ethanol is emissions reduction. While ethanol is only two thirds as efficient in producing energy as standard gasoline, meaning more fill-ups at the station, Yacobucci states that with advancing technology the “use of cellulose-based E10 could reduce

fossil energy consumption per mile by 8%, while cellulose-based E85 could reduce fossil energy consumption by roughly 70%” (CRS-16). In general, one of the benefits of cellulosic ethanol is that it not only burns more cleanly but it also “obviates the need for a widely used gas additive...that helps car engines run more smoothly and pollute less” (Knauer 76).

As mentioned above, assigning a monetary value to environmental benefits from corn ethanol is a difficult task and can only be truly quantified by measuring a decrease in emissions and oil purchases resulting from increased ethanol production. Yet, cellulosic ethanol brings greater benefits to the environment than corn and even Brazilian sugar ethanol. Cellulosic ethanol can be made using plant waste products such as woodchips from logging and corn stalk from harvested corn. Cellulosic biomass such as switchgrass can be grown on lands that are not being used to produce anything currently, and are very minimally destructive for the land on which it is grown (USDA). Finally, carbon emissions will decrease substantially with the use of ethanol in general. A great portion of the monetary benefits of cellulosic ethanol will have to be formed through future price predictions and emissions benefits which may result in a larger margin of error.

Qualitatively, however, the benefits of cellulosic ethanol are considerable. Cellulosic ethanol will allow new marginal lands, including non-arable land, to be used for biomass production. This will open up new markets in different regions of the United States to profit from ethanol production. Cellulosic ethanol will also not decrease food production. According to the USDA at congressional hearings on ethanol in the summer of 2007, the United States has limited capacity to increase corn ethanol production much further than it already has, leaving the door open for cellulosic ethanol to meet America’s alternative energy needs.

Additionally, cellulose expert, Dr. Lee Lynd, claims that cellulose, “offers game-changing environmental benefits, manageable technology, and no showstoppers if we have the will to develop it” (Weeks). The 2007 Farm Bill claims that cellulosic energy will “create economic opportunities for many farmers in diverse geographic regions across the United States” (USDA). Like corn ethanol, cellulosic ethanol will provide jobs and income to the regions that can produce or refine the ethanol. Unlike corn, however, cellulosic ethanol is not restricted to the Corn Belt and therefore may open up new markets in regions all across the United States, benefiting a wider group of people. From an equity-of-distribution standpoint, cellulosic ethanol will help level the playing field for people all across the United States who would like to benefit from this new technology.

Costs

It is clear that costs are not the same across the board; all ethanol is not made alike. In deed, corn is more costly than cellulose, but cost also depends on the fuel used to produce the ethanol as well. There are some corn ethanol producers that want to use coal instead of natural gas or other clean fuels to power their production in order to lower costs (Little). In coal states such as Kentucky, there is an even greater incentive to use coal and fuel local industry, rather than using cleaner fuels to result in a more environmentally friendly ethanol. Norris argues that “critics have long argued that traditional ethanol production consumes nearly as much fossil fuel energy as it saves, once all the energy costs of growing and processing corn are factored in,” along with production energy costs. In contrast, other ethanol plants, such as the Panda Group, use local manure to fuel their production centers. The number of production centers using manure to fuel production is increasing and is becoming especially popular with smaller ethanol plants. By extracting the methane in cow manure the plant cleans up the air in two ways: first by producing cleaner ethanol rather than traditional carbon emitting fuels, and secondly by reducing the amount of methane which normally pollutes the air naturally from livestock manure.

There are more than just monetary costs included in this analysis. Those costs that can be quantified include the costs associated with increased infrastructure, subsidies, and production of the ethanol. The production costs include the land use necessary to produce the biomass for cellulosic ethanol, the fertilizer and pesticides that will also have to go into producing a new crop and, finally, manpower. The cost to those working in production of food at this stage in the analysis is unquantifiable, as it is largely unknown how much land will be moved from use for food production to cellulose production.

Infrastructure costs will also play a pivotal role in calculating the costs to the consumer and taxpayer. Moving forward with ethanol on a large scale will require an overhaul of the infrastructure necessary to transport and pump the new fuel. Ethanol is corrosive and can decay untreated joints and “tends to clean the internal surfaces, making them more susceptible to corrosion from water inside” (API). These issues can possibly be corrected by coating and treating the pipeline but may also require new infrastructure as a whole. In federal Congressional hearings on alternative energy, infrastructure is frequently referred to as the third stool leg. Ethanol, infrastructure, and vehicles together are known as the three stool legs; if any of these three portions are missing then the market will not stand on its own. Therefore, flex-fuel vehicles capable of running on ethanol and the infrastructure required to operate and maintain them must hit the market at the same time in order for the market to succeed.

The other leg of the stool analogy is the automobile industry. Currently all vehicles are capable of running on an E10 or E15 mix of ethanol and gasoline. This means that 10 percent or 15 percent of the fuel running the vehicle is made from ethanol and the remainder is regular gasoline. Currently, just under half of the gasoline in the United States is blended at the E10 rate (American Coalition for Ethanol). A cleaner fuel, however, is E85, the other common ethanol-gasoline blend for vehicles. This blend can only be used in automobiles that are designed as flex-fuel vehicles capable of running on high levels of ethanol. According to the Honorable David McCurdy, President of the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, changing a fleet of vehicles over to be capable of running off of E85 will be costly and time-consuming (Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers). It is entirely possible to change a fleet of cars and it is clear that this trend has started. Nonetheless, with Detroit suffering from their inability to compete with foreign cars and an economic recession looming in coming months, this change to accommodate new fuels and higher fuel economy standards will be costly and met with resistance. Others, however, such as Kurtzman of the Milken Institute, contend that the cost of making cars ethanol compatible is as easy as changing one relatively inexpensive part.

Other main costs will be production costs which will vary between corn and cellulosic. The costs of fertilizer and pesticides will have to be accounted for and are significantly higher for corn ethanol than they will be for cellulosic ethanol. Corn ethanol is very hard on the land and intensive in both fertilizer and pesticide use, which will increase costs dramatically, both financially and in terms of the emissions efficiency of the end product. Additionally, some land used for the production of other crops or land that was out of production will likely be shifted to corn production or even cellulosic biomass production in the future; these opportunity costs must be accounted for.

Additionally, there are costs to ethanol that are a direct result of the increasing corn production in the Midwest. The legislative mandate for ethanol usage and production has increased not only corn prices but corn production in the Midwest. Increased corn production in the Midwest however has not resulted in increased food production. Indeed, despite increases in production there are still decreases in overall output of corn for food because over 30% of the corn yield annually goes toward ethanol production (Etter). America is the world’s largest supplier of corn and, as such, the increasing use of corn as ethanol has caused a decrease of corn-based food products on the global market (Runge and Senauer). This has resulted in less food being transported to the already starving nations in the third world, thereby generating a

great deal of controversy over American ethanol production. In fact, prices on food using corn or high fructose corn syrup have increased in price over the last few years. Meat prices are also on the rise as the corn produced in the Midwest provides feed for cattle (both beef and dairy), pigs, and chickens.

Another far-removed cost of increased corn production for ethanol is the long-term environmental effect of the crop itself. The increase of corn production at the cost of other crops has limited crop rotation which results in soil erosion. This is not only bad for future crop yields but also results in greater run-off. Corn fertilizers and pesticides result in an excess of nitrogen that leaks into the ground water or runs off into streams and rivers and eventually joins up with the Mississippi River that drains into the Gulf of Mexico. The nitrogen from the corn production in the Corn Belt has now resulted in oxygen deprivation in the waters off of Louisiana and Texas (USGS). This condition is known as hypoxia and has resulted in decreasing fish populations and loss of plant life in this area (USGS). This condition is very serious for affected ecosystems and will continue to worsen as corn yields and production increase. While these costs seem far-removed from the actual cost of ethanol production, they are in fact a direct result of increased corn production for ethanol. Costs such as these are often not factored into cost-benefit analyses on ethanol production but are typically used by critics as proof that corn ethanol does not necessarily have a positive effect on the environment.

Finally, another cost of ethanol is the tax credits for corn ethanol that work as a subsidy for ethanol producers. These tax credits cost the government revenue that it would otherwise collect in taxes from producers. The Congressional Research Service reports the tax credits on ethanol to be 51 cents per gallon. According to the report, "this incentive allows ethanol - which has historically been more expensive than conventional gasoline - to compete with gasoline and other blending components" (Yacobucci PP 2). These tax incentives, as well as the additional credits and exemptions given to ethanol, will be a large portion of the costs to the American taxpayer. Unfortunately, the government is currently also taxing ethanol. There is a 19 cent per gallon tax on ethanol blended gasoline at the pump (Gas Taxes Links). This policy keeps ethanol from being competitive on the market. The best policy for the American government to pursue at this stage would be to decrease the tax on ethanol blended gasoline in order to make ethanol more competitive with non-blended gasoline on the market.

IV. Policy Implications

The first policy implication, mentioned above, involves the fact that an ethanol tax makes the fuel, even when blended with gasoline, more costly to consumers. In addition to this tax is the tariff on Brazilian ethanol which is reducing potential supply of this greener fuel; dropping the tariff on imported sugar ethanol from Brazil will likely be necessary to meet future legislative goals. By fixing the stiff U.S. fiscal policy relating to subsidies, taxes, and tariffs on ethanol to allow a more free-market approach would certainly have long-term benefits for the ethanol market. However, it is important to note that in order to make this industry viable in the short term the subsidies must remain a cost to tax payers and be lessened gradually over time as ethanol becomes more stable on the market.

Another major implication of the findings of this analysis is that ethanol production is not financially beneficial for America in the short term. While it is hard to calculate ethanol's actual benefit to the environment, a predominant corn ethanol industry does not create benefits that outweigh the costs. The greatest benefits are seen in the rural corn farming communities and in the regions where ethanol plants are being built and will be built in the future. Assuming that Hahn and Cecot are wrong about the future support for biofuels, this analysis clearly shows that a shift away from increasing corn ethanol toward cellulosic is in the best interest of the United States. Cellulosic ethanol will provide a wider variety of benefits to a

greater amount of people in the United States. However, we may only begin to see these benefits by the year 2020. Again, it is important to observe the slow, methodical Brazilian timeline and keep in mind that these momentous technological advances do not occur overnight. Not only that, the automobile industry and infrastructure must also keep pace with these developments for ethanol to be of any help.

There are also clear benefits in terms of energy dependence and national security. Increasing the use of ethanol will help the United States decrease its dependency on the Middle East for oil. The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 assures a future for biofuels at least until the year 2022 for the purposes of energy independence and to help stop global warming. At that point, however, if ethanol has failed to create its own market it is likely that critics will point to the failures of ethanol as inherent and the alternative energy movement may suffer a large blow. This fact has one very important implication on public policy: ethanol plays a tangible and innovative role in the alternative energy movement. As an alternative energy, ethanol is one of the first sources that has the potential to have a huge effect on United States transportation. The potential for large-scale, cost-effective production of ethanol exists, and as the quantity of ethanol on the market increases it becomes the symbol of new alternative energy and green fuels. As a result, critics maintain that if the industry fails to meet the goals set by the legislature or if ethanol remains too costly there may be grave consequences for the entire green fuel movement. Whether or not this would prove true is debatable; however, this concept proposed by critics of the green movement indicates that they would feel a sense of empowerment if ethanol did fail to reach its legislative mandates.

It is crucial to conclude from this analysis that, no matter what the benefits are of producing one particular type of ethanol, in order to meet America's growing demand given the supply of corn, a combination approach may be necessary. Cellulosic ethanol is only one part of a larger puzzle. Solving the energy question in America will necessitate many types of alternative energy used in conjunction with one another. Overall, adoption of biofuels as a larger part of U.S. transportation fuel seems inevitable, and until fuel cells reach the mainstream market ethanol is the only viable alternative fuel that is available.

My own conclusion from this research is that like coal, corn ethanol is an inevitable force in America's green movement. In America, both of these energy sources are abundant. The coal industry, as well as farm unions, will not allow Washington to neglect the needs of their industry. Instead of constantly battling with these energy giants, we should make this growing energy source as environmentally friendly as possible while at the same time making its production economically viable. A large portion of the United States has not adopted the need to save the environment as their mantra but instead look at alternative energy strictly from the perspective of national security. In order to meet this group in the middle environmentalists will have to search for new ways to improve corn ethanol production and commercialize the cellulosic ethanol market.

Works Cited

- Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers. The Honorable David McCurdy. Congressional hearings 2007. <<http://www.autoalliance.org/fuel/>>
- American Coalition for Ethanol. 2007. <<http://www.ethanol.org/index.php?id=50>>
- API. Washington, DC. 2000. <<http://www.api.org/aboutoilgas/sectors/pipeline/upload/pipelineethanolshipmentfinal.doc>>
- Blanco, Luisa and Michelle Isenhouer. "Powering America: The Impact of Ethanol in the Corn Belt States." Pepperdine University: Working Paper. February 2008.

- de Gorter, Harry and David R. Just. "The Economics of U.S. Ethanol Import Tariffs with a Consumption Mandate and Tax Credit." Working Paper: October 2007.
- DesJardins, Joseph R. "Environmental Ethics: An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy." Thomson Wadsworth. Canada: 2006.
- Energy Information Administration (EIA). "Biofuels in the US Transportation Sector." Annual Energy Outlook 2007. Washington, DC: February 2007.
- Ethanol Across America. "Issue Brief: Economic Impacts of Ethanol Production." Spring 2006.
- Etter, Lauren. "Ethanol Craze Cools As Doubts Multiply." The Wall Street Journal. November 28, 2007.
- Gas Taxes Links. Gasoline Taxes by State. <<http://www.gaspricewatch.com/usgastaxes.asp>>
- Goodstein, Eban S. "Economics and the Environment, 4th edition." John Wiley & Sons, Inc. USA: 2005.
- Hahn, Robert and Caroline Cecot. "The Benefits and Costs of Ethanol." Working Paper: November 2007.
- Hargreaves, Steve. "Calming Ethanol-Crazed Corn Prices." CNNMoney.com. 2007. <http://money.cnn.com/2007/01/30/news/economy/corn_ethanol/index.htm>
- Hester, Annette. "A Fresh Approach to US Energy Security and Alternative Fuels: The Western Hemisphere and the Ethanol Option." CIGI Working Paper, Working Paper 10: October 2006.
- Hester, Annette. "A Strategy Brief on US Ethanol Markets and Policies." CIGI Working Paper, Technical Paper 1: March 2007
- Knauer, Kelly (ed.) "Global Warming." Time Magazine. Time Inc. Home Entertainment: 2007.
- Keohane, Nathaniel O. and Sheila M. Olmstead. "Markets and the Environment." Island Press. Washington, D.C.: 2007.
- Kurtzman, Joel. Lecture at Pepperdine University: February 2008. The Milken Institute. Senior Fellow.
- Little, Amanda Griscom. "Warts and Ethanol. Grist: May 2006. <<http://www.grist.org/cgi-bin/printthis.pl?uri=/news/muck/2006/05/26/unethacoal/>>
- Montenegro, Maywa. "The Big Three." Grist: December 2006. <<http://grist.org/news/maindish/2006/12/04/montenegro/>>
- Norris, Scott. "New Ethanol Plants to be Fueled with Cow Manure." *National Geographic News*. August 18, 2006. <<http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2006/08/060818ethanol.html>>
- Reel, Monte. "Brazil's Road to Energy Independence." Washington Post: August 20, 2006. <<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/08/19/AR2006081900842.html>>
- Runge, C. Ford and Benjamin Senauer. "How Biofuels Could Starve the Poor." *Foreign Affairs*. May/June 2007. <<http://www.foreignaffairs.org>>
- USDA. 2007 Farm Bill. Title IX. 2007.
- USDA. "Biomass as a Feedstock for a Bioenergy and Bioproducts Industry." US Department of Energy: 2007.
- USGA. "Hypoxia." Toxic Substances Hydrology Program. December 2006. <<http://toxics.usgs.gov/definitions/hypoxia.html>>
- United States House Resolution 6.
- United Nations Development Program. Human Development Reports: 2007/2008. <<http://hdrstats.undp.org/indicators/235.html>>
- Vig, Norman J. and Michael E. Kraft. (eds). "Environmental Policy: New Directions for the Twenty-First Century." CQ Press. Washington, D.C.: 2007.

Weeks, Jennifer. "Professor Cellulose." Grist: December 2006.

<<http://www.grist.org/news/maindish/2006/12/12/weeks/index.html>>

Yacobucci, Brent D. and Randy Schnepf. Ethanol and Biofuels. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: March 16, 2007.

Yacobucci, Brent D. Fuel Ethanol: Background and Public Policy Issues. Congressional Research Service Report for Congress: July 30, 2007.

Mental Health Care in India: Prescribing the Right Policy

By KIMBERLY MELTZER

I. Introduction

Mental health is a vital aspect of health and essential to human development. Mental illness is prevalent throughout the world, and with many disorders left untreated due to inadequate services, mental health care needs to be improved. The problem is most severe in developing countries, posing a burden for global development (Kaplan, “World”). India is one such country in the developing world with a fragmented mental health system in need of improvement. Tailoring mental health care to local conditions and demographics is the most effective way to improve care, because different problems among countries require different solutions. Mental health care is not a widely recognized priority on the global health care agenda, and the differences in quality of mental health services can be attributed to varying global perspectives on the importance of mental health. Certain historical factors have influenced the progression of mental health issues, and, subsequently, policies that affect mental health care. Attitudes about mental health and its impact on well-being have been shaped by various factors such as how mental health is defined, its role in overall health, its relation to human rights, and a combination of economic, political, and social factors. All of these factors have contributed to greater recognition of mental health and its higher priority in health care in the more developed Western world as compared to the non-Western world.

India’s perspectives on mental health and standards of care have been complicated by developmental factors, resulting in recognition not upheld in practice. India is a country of particular interest due to this disparity between its rhetoric and reality, and looking at the history of mental health and the impact of these factors will help shape recommendations for improving mental health care. Mental health policy efforts and traditions of care continue to fall short of the country’s mental health care needs. Policy recommendations proposed in this paper center on community mental health care, which should and can be expanded by maximizing existing resources in the community. Increased training and education, in addition to research, should also be included in this effort. These recommendations are provided because they are cost-effective, beneficial for health, and take into account country-specific demographics to improve the state of mental health care in India.

II. Perspectives on Mental Health

Mental health is regarded differently across cultures. Due to varying global perspectives, mental health services throughout the world do not conform to the same standards because mental health care is not a universal priority. Generally speaking, the West holds a higher regard for mental health and has more adequate mental health services than in the non-Western world. Differences between the West and Asia can be attributed to each region’s unique history and to developmental factors that have determined the priority of mental

health care.

Mental Health Defined

Since mental health is a socially and culturally defined concept, perspectives on its importance vary. Different cultures conceptualize the nature of mental health in various manners according to social norms and values. In Reasoning about Madness, J.K. Wing asserts that the difficulty of defining health stems from its context—health, disease, and disability are all socially defined concepts, as the social contexts in which they evolve determine how certain characteristics are regarded (29). Disorders have different meanings in different cultures and are regarded according to societal values (Fabrega, Jr., “Culture” 391). With regard to cultural context, Roland Littlewood says the “language of medicine makes sense within our particular context, because we are embedded in that context” (509). On discussing mental disorders in China, Sing Lee says “Psychiatric disease constructs represent social constructs and genuine states of distress that have biopsychosocial sources [. . .] they have social uses peculiar to social groups in which they are created and legitimized. This is as true in the U.S. as in the rest of the world” (428). All cultures are afflicted with the burden of mental illness, but different cultural definitions and interpretations determine outcomes in health care. The way in which mental health is regarded depends on regional context, and so variations exist between Asia and the West. Conceptualizing mental health and disorders in India is specific to Indian culture and societal values, and therefore mental health policy should be country-specific.

Role in Overall Health

The importance afforded to mental health affects its perceived role in overall health and health care. Health is typically associated with conditions pertaining to the body. Kumar argues that we tend to focus on physical ailments in health and ignore mental health:

In the past and in the present also, in the field of health, our mind has been preoccupied with communicable diseases because they are the biggest causes of death in the population. These diseases have partly been conquered. We have been looking at health in terms of physical health, while neglecting mental health. Over the years, mental illness has increased manifold. (“India”)

Not all cultures recognize the same connection, if any, between the body and the mind. If too much consideration is given to physical health, psychological health may be underemphasized or not valued at all. Consequently, people may assume that mental health has a minimal effect on overall health and a limited role or no role in health care. Regarding the ‘body-mind problem,’ Wing says “there is no logical reason why physical and mental events should not interact” (30). Since cultures recognize the connection between mind and body differently, care for the mind comes in different forms. Viewing the body as a system, rather than separate parts such as the distinction between body and mind, constitutes the basis of Chinese medicinal care (Kirmayer and Groleau 470). This systemic concept may explain the lack of specific focus on mental health care in China, which would emphasize the mind rather than caring for the body as a whole, complex system. Such an ancient view in Chinese culture may lower the importance of mental health care if that traditional view continues to be salient. In India, the view that the mind can affect the body is becoming more common. The mind and body were thought to be separate components, but over the past few decades, researchers have found that psychological factors can bring about not only mental illness but physical illness as well (Kumar, “Understanding”).

A triad view of overall health has evolved, comprised of the interaction among physical, social, and mental well-being, which has increased the importance of mental health. This more complex view has most likely emerged to affirm the connection between mental health and physical health, because a sole focus on the latter ignores the impact of mental health on well-being, an idea that has become more pronounced with increased education and advocacy efforts. The World Health Organization (WHO) defines health according to this triad model, as “a state of complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity” (“Constitution”). Such a well-known international institution declaring the importance of mental health in overall health has been significant. A.V. Shah also defines health according to this model of well-being and proclaims mental health to be “the most essential and inseparable component of health” (qtd. in Kumar “Understanding”).

Human Rights

The place mental health has in human rights has also been a determinant of the importance of mental health care. The priority for mental health stems from an evolving concept of human rights that includes the right to health. According to Shridhar Sharma, the modern idea of human rights is rooted in equal creation, which evolved into the concept of certain natural, individual rights, and finally a “transition from individual liberty to social entitlement” in which society is responsible for citizens’ well-being, including the right to health (“Evolving”).

The United Nations helped to promote international regard for the right to health and the societal obligation to provide it with the formation of the WHO and a multitude of resolutions, including those that expanded on the concept of the right to mental health. Shridhar Sharma contends that “health as a right took on a higher value” with the formation of the WHO, whose goal is to make it possible for all people to obtain the highest possible level of health, according to the definition of health in its Constitution (“Evolution”). The Constitution of the WHO indicates that the right to health is a fundamental right (WHO “Constitution”). The “Universal Declaration of Human Rights” declared health as a human right (United Nations, “Universal”), and Article 12 of the UN General Assembly’s “International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights” further defined the right of health to include mental health (United Nations, “International”). Mental health and human rights became more valued with the 1978 Declaration of Alma Ata, which promoted the integration of mental health services with primary health care in order for everyone to be healthy by the year 2000, and the UN General Assembly’s “The Principles for the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and the Improvement of Mental Health Care” in 1991 (Shridhar Sharma, “Evolution”).

Although the concept of human rights has evolved to include mental health as a fundamental and universal right, there are disparities about how this right is viewed in regards to the state of mental health care throughout the world. Shridhar Sharma attributes “the foundations of the modern concepts of universal human rights” as having “evolved out of centuries of economic, political, and ideological conflicts in the West” (“Evolving”). In Asia, human rights awareness and implementation vary, but there has been a change in government perspective about human rights and, in turn, psychiatric care (Shridhar Sharma, “Asian”). People claim that the human rights of patients with mental illnesses align with the standards of developed countries and that inadequate care is due to the lack of facilities, trained personnel, and psychosocial support systems, especially in growing urban populations (Shridhar Sharma, “Asian”). A major contributing factor to poor human rights records is stigma associated with mental illness, which differs between Asia and the West. Although stigma may always be attached to some extent, mental illness is less stigmatized in the West than in Asia, a fact that has contributed to better mental health care and human rights in the West. The effect of

stigma, which is associated with awareness about mental disorders, can be attributed to the historical development of both the Western and Asian regions.

India's view on the right to health aligns with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, but there is debate on the extent of India's attention to human rights. Increased awareness about human rights and mental illness led to progressive legislation to protect the human rights of people with mental illness, such as the Indian Mental Health Act of 1987 and the establishment of the National Human Rights Commission, which is aided by non-governmental organizations to investigate cases of abuse towards people with mental illness (Shridhar Sharma, "Human"- "Asian"). Amnesty International contends that India's human rights record is poor, with human rights violations and attacks on human rights defenders and activists ("Asia-Pacific"). In light of the contentions as to where India stands, it still seems plausible that India's view on human rights contributes to more adequate mental health care and alignment with developed countries than other Asian nations such as China which has no human rights commission. The reality of human rights in India may not match its rhetoric, but the fact that the rhetoric is established makes it more progressive in terms of human rights awareness.

III. Historical Development: The West vs. Asia

Economic, political, and social factors have determined regional rates of development and contributed to the state of mental health care in the Western and non-Western worlds. Mental health care is generally more recognized and of higher quality in the West, because countries are not experiencing rapid economic transitions that are bringing about significant developmental changes as in other parts of the world (Desjarlais et al. 4). Less developed countries are transitioning into the infrastructure and institutions that the more developed Western states have already had in place for quite some time. Along with this progress and development come adverse consequences to society in terms of survival and functioning, evidenced by mental health problems in these improving countries:

[. . .] economic progress and gains in overall longevity have been accompanied by an increase in the social, psychiatric, and behavioral pathologies that have become a part of daily life in North America and Western Europe [. . .] along with the increase in life expectancy has come an increase in depression, schizophrenia, dementia, and other forms of chronic mental illness, primarily because more people are living into the age of risk. (Desjarlais et al. 3-4)

Because the Western world developed much faster than Asia, the mental health field and relevant care was able to progress unlike in India, which is currently experiencing the great economic transitions that have already occurred in the West.

Though regional rates of development may partly explain differences in mental health care between the West and Asia, lengthier periods of economic development do not necessarily equate with better care. A more complete explanation for the disparities in mental health care should include the historical roots of the regions, which relate to rates of development. For example, Fabrega, Jr. discusses the evolution of the psychiatric profession as part of the histories of the regions. He asserts that all societies deal with problems of mental illness and hence develop knowledge and practices to combat such illness. The second half of the 18th century experienced demographic, social, and political economic changes that affected Anglo-European societies, such as changes in population sizes, migration and urbanization, industrialization, the growth of a capitalist economy, and the growth and evolution of the medical profession, which contributed to the history of the psychiatric profession ("Culture" 392-3). Other societies,

including ancient China and the Indian subcontinent, were influenced by “non-Western but equally major traditions of medicine” and “met some of the conditions that gave rise to psychiatry in Anglo European societies during the early modern period . . . [but] did not all share the exact mix of demographic and political economic conditions of early modern and modern Western societies”; instead, they were influenced by diverse social and cultural traditions and had integrated religious values (Fabrega, Jr., “Culture” 398). Although medical traditions do exist in Asia, they are not the same as those of the Western world. Asia is diverse due to its range of political ideologies, and influences from ancient Chinese and Indian traditions have contributed to views on health and health practices (Shridhar Sharma, “Asian”).

In non-Western countries, traditional medical systems such as Chinese medicine are still common amid the “worldwide ascendancy of modern Western medicine” (Lin, Smith, and Ortiz 531). Historical factors and cultural values have therefore contributed to a different system of medical care in Asia than in the West.

India has traditionally afforded importance to mental health, although it has approached mental illness differently than in Western societies. This can be attributed to differences in the evolution of psychiatry and medicine as mentioned by Fabrega, Jr. Cultural and religious values influenced the nature of the psychiatric profession and the approach to mental illness. According to Fabrega, Jr.’s discussion on traditional India, “ancient India’s cultural psychology, encompassing philosophical, religious, and moral/ethical dimensions” influenced how mental health and illness were viewed and served as the basis for the healing system, which included a “local system of support” in which family and villages were responsible for caring for the mentally ill (“Mental” 556). He also says that “Indian approaches to mental illness were not limited to discrete, separately defined conditions” but that there was a “broadly conceptualized model of mental health and illness” (“Mental” 557). India’s tradition is different from the West because of the integration of its culture and religious values, particularly in village settings, in the care given to people with mental illness. The notion of responsibility in traditional Indian culture may be a determinant of India’s health policy rhetoric as evidenced by its signing of the Declaration of Alma Ata, which corresponds with the idea of society’s obligation to ensure health for the population. India’s tradition of mental health care conforms to the concept of societal well-being including the right to health.

Shridhar Sharma characterizes Asia’s political and health systems, demographics, and economic strategies as transitional following European imperialism. As a result, the economic, political, and social systems are growing in diverse ways across and within Asian countries. In a general sense, the health systems in Asia mirrored those of Europe, specifically Britain, France, and Holland. The Asian health systems are becoming more influential in national policy due to a growing private sector. The idea that governments should provide health security for all citizens is becoming more common, but mental health care accessibility and availability varies throughout the region (“Asian”).

Transplanting a European health care structure to Asia seems to have contributed to the Asian region’s ineffective health infrastructure. Because of Asia’s diversity, a health care system analogous to the more homogenous European region yields a fragmented system in Asia. Michael Yahuda describes the new diplomatic order in Asia as “one that reflects the special characteristics of Asian states” (348). The European trend of integration, with its “pooling sovereignty” to establish a political order such as the European Union, does not apply to Asia where states wish to retain their sovereignty (Yahuda 348-9). In this sense, not only is it a poor idea to transplant a Western system to a diverse Asian region, but the sovereignty of the Asian states may make it necessary to tailor systems to individual countries.

Economic Factors

Developing economies and impoverished states have produced an inadequate state of mental health care in Asia. Low-income countries cannot support mental health services as well as more developed countries, and if services are available, they are typically of poor quality or people of low socioeconomic status cannot afford them. Although Asia is currently experiencing economic expansion, the region is still afflicted with much more poverty than the West. In the 1980s, global poverty increased, with economically disadvantaged countries experiencing a significant deterioration in living conditions, and in the 1990s, poor living conditions and an increasing global population “led to unprecedented poverty” (Desjarlais et al. 16). East and Southeast Asia saw strong economic growth later on as countries in the region were “growing economically at the fastest rate in the world,” which led to enhanced health care services, such as the growth of Taiwan’s mental health care system (Desjarlais et al. 17). In the Asia-Pacific region, China and India are the two rising “economic superpowers,” yet many people still live in poverty and lack adequate health care (Amnesty International, “Regional”). This poverty is largely due to the prevalence of rural communities. The rural poor comprise more than 80 percent of poor people worldwide, with the largest number of these people living in Asia (Desjarlais et al. 19). In East Asia, “rapid economic growth” and “growing social and economic pressures” have resulted in many more people pursuing treatment for mental distress, but developing countries in the region have inadequate services compared to more developed economies, and people living in rural areas cannot afford treatment (Fan, “East”).

Despite rapid economic growth, much poverty remains in India, especially in the large rural populations, which leaves many people unable to afford mental health services. India’s economic growth rate has been credited with reducing poverty but, according to a 2002 estimate, 25 percent of the population lies below the poverty line (CIA, “Economy”). The major source of financing for mental health care in India is out-of-pocket expenditures incurred by patients or families (WHO, “Mental Health Atlas” 233). India’s poorer economic status yields poorer infrastructure, and its health care, including mental health care, is subsequently inadequate compared to other developed nations. Amount of funding may not necessarily be a source of discrepancy in quality of health care systems between India and more developed countries. Comparing India, a low-income country, to the United States, a high-income country, the proportion of health budget to GDP is 5.1 percent and 13.9 percent, respectively (WHO, “Mental Health Atlas” 232, 491). India allocates about 2.05 percent of its total health budget for financing mental health activities, while the United States allocates about 6 percent (WHO, “Mental Health Atlas” 233, 491). Although the United States spends more of its total budget on health care, including mental health, and has a much higher GDP and about one-third of India’s population, it is commonly argued that health care expenditure in the United States does not accurately represent the quality of health care.

Political Factors

Regional perspectives on mental health and care for the mentally ill have been shaped by varied political cultures, but Western politics have had a major influence on the progression of mental health in the non-Western world. Because mental health concepts are relative to the contexts in which they are constructed, different political contexts have produced variations in views on mental illness and mental health care. Defining mental health and illness becomes problematic “as soon as we start thinking of ‘not-health,’ defined according to the standards of some particular society or social group, as ‘disease’” (Wing 33). In the past, people questioned the legitimacy of treating mental illness because of accusations that some societies with “oppressive regimes” would use psychiatrists to ascribe medical conditions to social deviance in

order to “suppress political dissent” (Desjarlais et al. 35). For instance, according to Wing, the U.S. and Western Europe criticized the former Soviet Union for committing political dissenters to mental hospitals, and there was “much publicity about alleged abuse of psychiatry in the Soviet Union” (Wing 167). The Soviet and Western perspectives on political dissent produced differences in dealing with mental illness. Whereas the Soviet Union regarded publicly expressing views as political slander and responded punitively with institutional commitment, political dissent has become tolerated and even appreciated in the West, as public freedom of expression is “the foundation of political democracy in Great Britain and the U.S.A.” (Wing 168-9). It seems that democratic institutions are more apt to deal with mental health care in a humane manner due to the principles that shape democratic societies. Western political freedom and public attention to other nations seem to have influenced more humane mental health treatment in non-Western societies.

Political and moral ideologies have influenced the formation of health services for the mentally ill, with the West influencing progression to more humane treatment. Wing states that although both developed and developing countries have similar goals of promoting health and preventing disability, these goals take into account local contexts of economics and morality, and varying political philosophies determine the meanings of ‘need’ and ‘ability’ (194). The Western world experienced changes in mental health care due, in part, to political and moral ideologies. In the U.S. and Britain, the first mental hospitals were established “in reaction to intolerable conditions,” and the idea of more “moral” treatment for the mentally ill came about as there was a wave of new laws and provisions to protect their human rights (Wing 197). Political ideology influenced policy shifts toward community care and away from institutions in Western welfare regimes post-1945 (Carpenter). Western society began to make a shift away from mental institutions that were used to solve social problems. Different countries with such different political philosophies as the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States have experienced this trend in different ways (Wing 198).

Some believe that political factors cause an increase in mental health problems. For example, Zhang, a teacher from the eastern Chinese province of Shandong, observes that political campaigns by China’s Communist Party that have continued ever since China’s “so-called liberation” have caused people to experience “years under intolerable pressure” and hence greater mental health problems (Fan, “East”). This situation is exacerbated by the overarching view of mental health care in China. In Bai Fan’s report on the psychology profession in China, one can see the political dissidence exemplified by the Communist Party:

China’s Communist Party has traditionally regarded the psychological profession as an imported form of Western-influenced bourgeois decadence. Even the medically-based psychiatric profession was virtually non-existent until well after the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) had ended, and psychologists were almost unheard of until about a decade ago. (“China”)

Since India has been under Western influence, its political system has been more aligned with the Western world. Mental health policy in India has seen a shift from asylums to community care over the past few centuries (Goel et al. 6). Prior to independence from British rule, institutions for mentally ill people were common throughout India. English and European ideas about mental illness influenced the first institutions that were established in the Indian subcontinent in the 17th century (S.D. Sharma 25). The purpose of mental asylums was mainly to “protect the community from the insane,” thus taking a more custodial demeanor rather than a curative approach for treating mental illness (S.D. Sharma 25). The development of mental hospitals related to political developments in India, evidenced by the fact that “the 18th century was a very unstable period in Indian history” and the “events [that] gave rise to politi-

cal instability [. . .] also contributed to psychological and social turmoil” (S.D. Sharma 25). Early in the 20th century, negative publicity about poor conditions of mental hospitals under British control resulted in a more humanistic approach, with the Directorate of Health Services becoming responsible for overseeing hospitals rather than the Inspector General of Prisons (S.D. Sharma 27). This shift from punitive authority to health management in caring for the mentally ill shows the progression from a custodial to therapeutic nature for treating mental illness.

British influence was also seen in Indian legislation, as in the Indian Lunacy Act of 1912, where Britain tried to parallel its own legislation and institutions in India so that British soldiers in India could receive the same type of care offered in their home country (Khan 62). The traditional Indian mental health care system was not institution-based though, and “asylums were seen as the last resort in severely disturbed cases” (Khan 62). Faith healers played an important role in care, which was an outdated practice in the West but one still prevalent in India (Khan 62). The European system tried to replace an ancient Indian healing tradition, which rendered quite fragmented health care.

In the two decades following India’s independence, there was a shift from custodial to more treatment-based mental health care. Reports assessing the status of mental health revealed that asylums were not conducive to therapy or rehabilitation, and recommendations were given that centered on restorative efforts, such as establishing in-patient and outpatient facilities in general hospitals, individual mental health care facilities, and mental health institutions (Kumar, “Mental”). The 1970s and 1980s brought more initiatives in mental health care (Kumar, “Mental”). India’s National Mental Health Programme (NMHP) was adopted in 1982; it was the foundation for public health efforts pertaining to mental health (WHO, “Mental Health Atlas” 233). The NMHP aimed to improve the delivery of mental health care by alternative means, including treating mental disorders at the community level by using existing resources such as primary and community health workers (Kumar, “National”; Agarwal v). Initially, the program made progress, but overall it was ineffective because expanding efforts at the district level proved difficult (Kumar, “India”). The Central Council of Health and Family Welfare stated that mental health should be included in India’s total health program and all national health policies and programs, and thus in an effort to broaden the scope of mental health services to the community and to primary care, the Central Council assessed the NMHP in 1995 and subsequently created the District Mental Health Programme (DMHP) (Kumar, “National”; WHO, “Mental Health Atlas” 233). This initiative was a more feasible “national” mental health program because it penetrated the districts, which allowed for further integration of mental health care at the community level.

It seems that India’s post-British government may have been the least restrictive factor in the progression of mental health care. India’s government and legal system more closely resemble those of a “Western” nation, as it is a federal republic with a legal system based on English common law (CIA, “Government”). Other political issues are salient with respect to mental health, including international conflicts, violence, human rights violations, and disparities across states. The fact that India is comprised of 28 states and seven union territories poses a challenge for implementing successful national policies (CIA, “Government”).

Social Factors

Mental health exists in a psychosocial context, as demographic and social conditions can exacerbate mental illness and act as barriers to treatment. Developing countries are at the highest risk of the burden of mental illness, not only because of poor infrastructure, but demographic factors such as socioeconomic status, urban-rural disparities, gender, environmental stressors, natural disasters, and violence also hinder the progression and treatment of dis-

eases. Mental health problems associated with natural disasters, environmental scarcities, urbanization, and physical illness generally affect poorer communities more because there are no programs or services to lessen the impact of such factors (Desjarlais et al. 19). Poverty is highly associated with mental distress and disorders, and women are particularly vulnerable due to the increasing incidence of poverty among them (Belle 385). Although there is urbanization in Asia and the Pacific, there is a high rate of urban poverty in major cities due to rapid migration to cities with no prosperity as a result of industrialization (Desjarlais et al. 22). The rapid economic expansions in countries like China and India are still leaving many people in poverty. Low-income countries also have the double burden of “continued infectious diseases” and “chronic medical, mental, and behavioral conditions” (Desjarlais et al. 4). In addition to physical weakness and illness of the diseased poor, a lack of assets, population pressures, and powerlessness contribute to the perpetual state of poverty and so “poor people, like poor countries, almost always stay poor” (Desjarlais et al. 19). Poverty is one of the most detrimental factors for mental health, because it can cause and/or result from mental illness.

In addition to myriad socio-demographic factors, India faces overpopulation and conflicts with neighboring nations (CIA, “Introduction”). India is a populous country, and “the huge and growing population is the fundamental social, economic, and environmental problem” (CIA, “Economy”). The country is not only plagued with natural hazards but environmental stressors such as air pollution from industrial activity, which are detrimental to health (CIA, “Geography”). Both the urban and rural areas are afflicted with poverty and, consequently, inadequate health care. India has a large rural population, and poor people in rural areas lack basic infrastructure and economic prosperity (CIA, “Economy”). Without basic infrastructure, the rural poor suffer from a lack of mental health care or limited access to care, with no means to travel to distant urban areas that may have mental health services. Urban areas are poverty-stricken as well, so even if services are available, they are not always affordable. According to WHO’s Country Health Profile on India, there are “ad hoc provisions for health care if any” in urban slums, which have grown due to the increase in urban migration (2).

IV. Analysis of India

India is taken as a case study because it is in much need of mental health services as a developing country. Although still far behind the developed world, India is one of the more progressive Asian nations in terms of its perspective on mental health and actions it has taken in mental health care. The history of mental health care in India has seen some dramatic changes, and the factors affecting Asia have been important determinants in shaping the state of its mental health care attitudes and services. M. Sarada Menon asserts that mental health professionals in the 15-year period following India’s independence had a major impact on how mental health services and policy are conceptualized today, although the current understanding of policies, programs, and services for the most effective mental health care throughout India is due to the evolution of knowledge, research, and experience of past mental health professionals, planners, and policy-makers over many years (30). India has experienced some progressive legislation and transitions in mental health care, yet there are still gaps between policy rhetoric regarding rights and access to care and the reality of a treatment gap between the need for and actual coverage of mental health services.

Policy Recommendations

Recommendations for improving mental health care in India are based on India’s existing resources and take into account all factors that have shaped progression of mental health issues. The country’s demographics cannot be changed easily or quickly. Recommendations do

not try to eliminate issues such as poverty but instead take such conditions into consideration and maximize existing resources to improve services.

Investing in mental health care now will help prevent high economic, social, and treatment costs in the long-run that can result from continued inadequate mental health care. Untreated or inadequately treated mental illness detracts from national productivity and development. Mental health is gaining recognition for its importance to national development. According to Kumar, “it is undoubtedly a vital resource for a nation’s development and its absence represents a great burden to the economic, political and social functioning of the nation” (“Introduction”). Historically, it has been difficult to quantify the costs of mental illness because rather than being captured in death rate figures, mental illness induces significant economic and social costs, evidenced by lack of worker productivity and societal contribution (Desjarlais et al. 34). Economic costs due to impaired functioning and disability from mental illness affect human capital. 63.1 percent of the Indian population is between the ages of 15 and 64 (CIA, “People”). This age range constitutes the work force, and so the burden of mental illness affecting this population affects national productivity. Social costs including reduced social performance and contribution to society may have potential consequences for the mental, physical, and social well-being of family members, in addition to people with mental illness (Argandona and Kiev x). In general, mental illness is expected to increase in the next few decades since the number of people living to ages at risk for certain disorders is increasing, and this situation is projected for India (Desjarlais et al. 6; WHO, “Country Health” 15). Care for psychiatric disorders needs to be re-prioritized in India. D.S. Goel et al. affirm this by saying, “the enormous asymmetry between different domains of the mental healthcare delivery system and among various geographical regions illustrates the need for radical reordering of priorities” (13). As nations discover that mental illness affects not only individuals but also society at large, mental health care will assume a greater priority on the international agenda.

Mario Argandona and Ari Kiev say that traditional approaches of modern psychiatry are not uniformly appropriate for the developing world. In Western societies such as the United States, it is common to have a one-to-one doctor-patient model of care, but in developing countries where the number of patients highly surpasses the number of available psychiatrists, the traditional approach is ineffective and the developing world should use the public health model already in place, as it serves as an appropriate channel in which to incorporate psychiatric problems (x). Treatment would maximize the existing resources such as facilities and health care workers to ultimately treat more people in need, which will yield more preventative measures effective for reducing not only progression to chronic illness or undue suffering but also long-term costs to society (Argandona and Kiev xi). India attempted to improve treatment with the NMHP, but limitations in planning efforts rendered the program ineffective. Kumar says that “the absence of a central organization for mental health has been a serious constraint in post Independence planning in India” (“Need”). Planning is a key component of effective recommendations. A lack of mental health workers and misallocation of scarce resources limit adequate mental health care, but “fundamental flaws in perception and planning” are also significant deficiencies (Goel et al. 13). Planning and tailoring treatment approaches to local conditions responds to the cultural relativity that affects the perspective on mental health and illness.

Even though India has no mental health policy, it could still have more adequate mental health care. The United States has no unified mental health policy, and yet mental health care is much more developed (WHO, “Mental Health Atlas” 491). Some people might recommend that India establish a unified policy, but other recommendations that are smaller in scope and more fiscally, organizationally, and politically feasible would improve the state of mental health care. WHO argues that mental health policies are necessary because they guide programs and services aimed at preventing and treating mental disorders and promoting men-

tal health, without which such programs and services would be disorganized and ineffective (“Mental Health Policy Fact Sheet”). Having a policy is pragmatic, but it must take into account local conditions in India in order to be effective. This goes along with WHO’s idea that as a part of mental health policy and service development, programs help to afford basic treatment to people who suffer from mental disorders and even help to alleviate associated stigma and discrimination (“Mental Health Policy Fact Sheet”). The many disparities throughout and among India’s states would make implementing a national policy very difficult; therefore, programs at the community level are more appropriate.

India’s mental health system comprises mainly community care, with more curative services than in the past, as human rights receive more attention as well (Menon 30). Mental health care should be integrated further into communities, as community treatment is also a more cost-effective manner of care. Maintaining large, poorly staffed institutions with chronic patients produces a high cost to society (Argandona and Kiev x). Institutions are also quite ineffective, not only due to violations of human rights but poor care modeled after the European system. The mental health system inherited from the British was counterproductive to the traditional practice of mental health care which historically included community integration (Menon 31). Community care is most practical for India for various reasons. It is tailored to India’s historical tradition of mental health care, as it takes family and community structure into account, as well as cultural and religious values. Because the country is diverse, impoverished, and has large, remote rural populations, services would be more adequate since they would be more accessible and affordable to remote rural populations. Community mental health care is the most effective manner of care considering India’s economic, political, and demographic conditions.

Currently, mental health is incorporated into health care at the primary level, with primary care offering treatment services for severe mental disorders (WHO, “Mental Health Atlas” 233). S.P. Agarwal says that “India was perhaps the first country in the world, and certainly the first among developing countries to recognize the need to integrate mental health services with general health services at the primary care level” (v). This is evidence of India’s progressive nature. Care has involved and should involve more innovative mental health workers. Since there are a limited number of such workers in India, especially in rural areas, the role of mental health personnel can be taken over by various people. In addition to families, more innovative workers such as teachers and religious leaders are effective care providers. Faith healers in India have historically been involved in mental health care and continue to provide such treatment today, which shows the ineffectiveness of modeling care after the West where such a tradition vanished long ago, and such participative healers today are evidence of a “purely Indian approach to treating the mentally sick” (Khan 62). NGOs are also important resources, because they have been involved in care and should continue therapeutic work. One limitation with the community care model is distribution of medication. Although innovative mental health workers cannot prescribe medication, perhaps advocacy and education efforts can provide more medications at primary health care facilities. Increased availability and affordability of medication is quite feasible. India is home to a pharmaceutical industry large enough to guarantee the availability and low cost of most psychotropic drugs (WHO, “Mental Health Atlas” 233).

Increased training and education would improve service and policy development by increasing awareness and quality of services, reducing stigma and discrimination which are barriers to treatment, and improving human rights of people with mental illness. Qualified mental health professionals could train and educate people to become innovative mental health workers, who in turn may contribute to public education about mental illness and care. Education would increase awareness and aid in reducing stigma. Such workers could also help to educate and train other people to become innovative workers, which would reduce the demand

for qualified mental health professionals and increase the supply of workers with general mental health knowledge. Mental health teams comprised of innovative community workers should be formed for treatment in the case of disasters and emergencies which are quite common in India. A lack of education is one of India's demographic conditions, with uneducated rural poor at highest risk. Community workers and NGOs can help to educate the rural poor about mental health issues, which would ultimately improve services.

Research efforts should be expanded to increase evidence-based care. NGOs can assist with data collection for epidemiological research that will help improve future treatment. Epidemiological data is necessary for planning health services (Menon 31). Research is essential because it provides an assessment of needs and a basis for effective interventions, without which treatment could be ineffective or detrimental, as well as costly. Education and research would also help with proper use and allocation of medication.

V. Conclusion: India and Mental Health in the Grand Scheme

India's economic status, diversity among states, and demographic conditions contribute to both the inadequacy and necessity of mental health care. Socioeconomic conditions exacerbate mental illness and subsequently the need for adequate care. Political factors such as a democratic government and previous legislation make it feasible to implement recommendations for improved mental health care. The recommendations are relatively low-cost, with no direct request for increased funds; they only maximize existing resources. In order to develop an effective mental health system, services and programs need to be sustainable. To achieve this, efforts should be concentrated locally and perhaps expanded to the national level in the future. In this way, the mental health care system is tailored uniquely to conditions characteristic of India.

Health is an essential marker of human development. Although it is becoming more common to view overall health as encompassing physical, social, and mental well-being, mental health care is not yet universally recognized. Mental health care should vary according to cultural context, but it should take priority on every country's agenda. The consequences of untreated mental illness are often unacknowledged or underestimated and, as a result, mental health has generally been neglected as a public priority. Discounting the value of mental health is highly unwarranted for it is an integral aspect of overall health. As mental health care gains importance in overall health care, people with mental disorders will be afforded better treatment. Unnecessary human suffering from untreated mental illness is a violation of human rights. The right to mental health is fundamental and universal, and all societies are under an obligation to provide it.

Works Cited

- Agarwal, S.P., ed. Mental Health: An Indian Perspective, 1946-2003. New Delhi: Directorate General of Health Services, Ministry of Health & Family Welfare, 2004.
- Amnesty International. "Asia-Pacific: India." Amnesty International: Report 2006. <<http://web.amnesty.org/report2006/ind-summary-eng>>.
- . "Regional Overview – Asia-Pacific." Amnesty International: Report 2006. <<http://web.amnesty.org/report2006/2as-summary-eng>>.
- Argandona, Mario, and Ari Kiev. Mental Health in the Developing World: A Case Study in Latin America. New York: The Free Press, 1972.

- Belle, Deborah. "Poverty and Women's Mental Health." American Psychologist 45, no. 3 (1990): 385-389.
- Carpenter, Mick. "'It's a Small World': Mental Health Policy under Welfare Capitalism Since 1945." Sociology of Health & Illness 22, no. 5 (2000): 602-620.
- Central Intelligence Agency. The World Factbook.
<<https://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/in.html>>.
- Cohen, Alex, Arthur Kleinman, and Benedetto Saraceno, eds. World Mental Health Casebook: Social and Mental Health Programs in Low-Income Countries. New York: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.
- Crossette, Barbara. "Mental Illness Found Rising in Poor Nations." The New York Times 16 May 1995, sec. C9.
- Desjarlais, Robert, et al. World Mental Health: Problems and Priorities in Low-Income Countries. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Fabrega, Jr., Horacio. "Culture and History in Psychiatric Diagnosis and Practice." Mezzich and Fabrega, Jr. Section I.
- . "Epilogue." Mezzich and Fabrega, Jr. Section IV.
- . "Mental Health and Illness in Traditional India and China." Mezzich and Fabrega, Jr. Section IV.
- Fan, Bai. "China on the Couch: Psychologists Struggle to Meet Demand." Radio Free Asia. Trans. Luisetta Mudie. Ed. Sarah Jackson-Han. 14 September 2006.
<http://www.rfa.org/english/china/2006/09/14/china_couch/>.
- . "East Asia's Mental Health Challenge." Radio Free Asia. Trans. Luisetta Mudie. Ed. Sarah Jackson-Han. 10 October 2006.
<http://www.rfa.org/english/features/2006/10/10/asia_mentalhealth/>.
- Frost, Lynda E., and Richard J. Bonnie, eds. The Evolution of Mental Health Law. Washington, D.C.: American Psychological Association, 2001.
- Goel, D.S., et al. "Mental Health 2003: The Indian Scene." Agarwal 3-24.
- Jenkins, Rachel, et al., eds. Developing a National Mental Health Policy. Maudsley Monographs 43. UK: Psychology Press Ltd, 2002.
- Kaplan, Arline. "Psychiatry and Human Rights Abuses." Psychiatric Times XX.11 (1 October 2004). <<http://www.psychiatristimes.com/ptg031001.html>>.
- . "World Mental Health Needs: Replacing Impressions with Facts." Psychiatric Times 23. 4 (1 April 2006): 69-76.
- Khan, M.A.M. "Indian Psychiatry: The British Connection." Agarwal 62-64.
- Kirmayer, Laurence J., and Danielle Groleau. "Affective Disorders in Cultural Context." Mezzich and Fabrega, Jr. Section II.
- Kumar, Anant. "Mental Health in a Public Health Perspective." The Bihar Times: A Passage to Bihar. <http://www.bihartimes.com/articles/anant/mental_health.html>.
- Lee, Sing. "From Diversity to Unity: The Classification of Mental Disorders in 21st-Century China." Mezzich and Fabrega, Jr. Section I.
- Lin, Keh-Ming, Michael W. Smith, and Viviana Ortiz. "Culture and Psychopharmacology." Mezzich and Fabrega, Jr. Section III.
- Littlewood, Roland. "Psychotherapy in Cultural Contexts." Mezzich and Fabrega, Jr. Section III.
- Lopez, Steven R., and Peter J.J. Guarnaccia. "Cultural Psychopathology: Uncovering the Social World of Mental Illness." Annual Review of Psychology 51.1 (2000): 571-598.
- Menon, M. Sarada. "Mental Health in Independent India: The Early Years." Agarwal 30-36.
- Mezzich, Juan E., and Horacio Fabrega, Jr., eds. Cultural Psychiatry: International Perspectives. The Psychiatric Clinics of North America Ser. 24.3. Philadelphia: W.B. Saunders Company, 2001.

- Mohit, Ahmad. "Report of WHO's World Mental Health Survey." The Lancet 367.9515 (2006): 968-969.
- Neugebauer, Richard, ed. Rev. of World Mental Health: Problems and Priorities in Low Income Countries, by Robert Desjarlais, et al. American Journal of Public Health 86.11 (1996): 1654-1656.
- Pedersen, Paul B., Norman Sartorius, and Anthony J. Marsella, eds. Mental Health Services: The Cross-Cultural Context. Cross-Cultural Research and Methodology Ser. 7. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, Inc., 1984.
- Shah, A.V. "Integration of Mental Health." Indian Journal of Psychiatry 24 (1982). Quoted in Anant Kumar, "Mental Health in a Public Health Perspective," The Bihar Times: A Passage to Bihar, http://www.bihartimes.com/articles/anant/mental_health.html, Understanding Mental Health.
- Sharma, S.D. "Mental Health: The Pre-independence Scenario." Agarwal 25-29.
- Sharma, Shridhar. "Human Rights in Psychiatric Care: An Asian Perspective." Acta Psychiatrica Scandinavica Supplementum 101.399 (2000): 97-101.
- The WHO World Mental Health Survey Consortium. "Prevalence, Severity, and Unmet Need for Treatment of Mental Disorders in the World Health Organization World Mental Health Surveys." Journal of the American Medical Association 291.21 (2004): 2581-2590.
- United Nations. "International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights." Official Document System of the United Nations. New York: United Nations. 16 December 1966. <<http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/21/ares21.htm>>.
- . "Universal Declaration of Human Rights." Official Document System of the United Nations. New York: United Nations. 1948. <http://www.un.org/documents/instruments/docs_en.asp?type=declarat>.
- Wing, J.K. Reasoning about Madness. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- World Health Organization. Advocacy for Mental Health: Mental Health Policy and Service Guidance Package. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2003. <http://www.who.int/mental_health/resources/policy_services/en/index.html>.
- . "Constitution of the World Health Organization." WHO Constitution. Geneva: World Health Organization. <<http://www.who.int/governance/eb/constitution/en/index.html>>.
- . "Country Health Profile: India." Country Health Profile – India. WHO Regional Office for South-East Asia. <<http://www.searo.who.int/EN/Section313/Section1519.htm>>.
- . "Country Projects on Mental Health: Selected Cases." Mental Health: Country Focus. Geneva: World Health Organization. <http://www.who.int/mental_health/policy/policy/en/index1.html>.
- . Integrating Poverty and Gender into Health Programmes: A Sourcebook for Health Professionals (Module on Mental Health). WHO Regional Office for the Western Pacific, 2005. <http://www.wpro.who.int/publications/pub_9290612983.htm>.
- . Mental Health: A Call for Action by World Health Ministers. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2001. <http://www.who.int/mental_health/resources/advocacy/en/index.html>.
- . Mental Health Atlas 2005. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2005. <<http://site.ebrary.com/lib.pepperdine.edu/lib/pepperdine/Topid=10104342&layout=document>>.
- . "Mental Health Policy Fact Sheet." Mental Health: Policy, Legislation, Service Planning and Human Rights. World Health Organization. <http://www.who.int/mental_health/policy/en/>.
- . Organization of Services for Mental Health: Mental Health Policy and Service Guidance Package. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2003. <http://www.who.int/mental_health/resources/policy_services/en/index.html>.

- . The Mental Health Context. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2003.
<http://www.who.int/mental_health/resources/policy_services/en/index.html>.
 - . The World Health Report 2001: Mental Health: New Understanding, New Hope. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2001. <<http://site.ebrary.com/lib.pepperdine.edu/lib/pepperdine/Doc?id=10015759>>.
 - . Working With Countries: Mental Health Policy and Service Development Projects. Geneva: World Health Organization, 2002.
<http://www.who.int/mental_health/policy/policy/en/index.html>.
- Yahuda, Michael. "The Evolving Asian Order: The Accommodation of Rising Chinese Power." Power Shift: China and Asia's New Dynamics. Ed. David Shambaugh. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005. 347-361.

Going All In: The Gamble of Globalization and European Economic Integration

By *LAUREN S. KOFFS*

I. Introduction

Globalization is a complicated concept. It has vast effects due to its political, social, and economic connotations. To politicians, globalization is an ideal interaction between states. They characterize globalization to suit their political needs. For instance, Bill Clinton referred to it as the “world without walls”; to Tony Blair it was “inevitable and irresistible”; while George W. Bush labels it “ties of trade and trust” (MacGillivray 4). While these alliterations are catchy and appealing to an uninformed and therefore unsuspecting public, to the economic mind globalization comprises much more. This article focuses on globalization and its effects on European economic integration, as well as the conflicting nature of its relationship with nationalism and with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). It demonstrates that trusting globalization has reaped great benefits, with more to come in the future if continued advances in European Economic integration, coupled with the effects of globalization, are handled properly. Enacting correct policies, such as rallying public opinion in favor of globalization, will ensure that Europe profits from globalization and integration.

According to economist Paul Krugman, globalization is an all-encompassing phrase for increasing world trade and links among financial markets in various countries and numerous other modes in which the world’s borders are shrinking (qtd. in MacGillivray 5). Many economists’ definitions of globalization focus on the central role of trade and finance, not simply on social and political themes. Under this definition, however, to make trade and finance a central part of globalization, declining information and communications costs must also be taken into account when defining globalization. A substantial convergence in the individual governments’ economic policies, particularly those concerning the integration of their liberalized market-led development into that of the entire European Economic Area, are important as well. This affects the role of national sovereignty in the European economic relationship.

Since trade, finance, and globalization are the fundamental components of European integration or “Europeanization,” it is logical to question if the current system in Europe is in accordance with the original goals of the European Coal and Steel Community. In the post-World War II period, a certain social model emerged among the Western European countries to ensure lasting peace as they tried to rebuild. It is often suggested that globalization and Europeanization undermine that important social model. These skeptics make some valid points, but in reality they fail to consider how globalization and Europeanization positively affect and inform public policy-making (Hay and Rosamond 17).

Context, in the case of globalization, matters less than the ideas that main economic actors create regarding an economic scenario. Their ideas shape the results. The hyper-globalization theory proposes that in a globalized milieu characterized by the increased and free mobility of capital, “vicious competition between states will serve to drive down the level of corporate taxation” (Hay and Rosamond 5). Hay and Rosamond argue that policy makers act-

ing on a foundation of suppositions in harmony with their proposed hyper-globalization theory may actually, even if accidentally, bring about results that support hyper-globalization, irrespective of its authenticity. In fact, in certain cases such as the European Union, this theory can reach its fullest extent, as capital mobility is completely free.

According to European statesman Robin Cook, the economy is becoming increasingly global. Production can no longer keep up with trade, which is now growing at twice the speed of manufacturing; British Airways operates backroom work in India, while bakers in England hire dozens of new staff since English baguettes are selling well in France. Solutions that worked yesterday will not be appropriate for tomorrow (Cook). Due to international integration from former empires, world wars, and increased international interaction in general, people are trying and succeeding in new and different business ventures and outsourcing all over the world. Globalization is usually viewed as the breakdown of borders while at the same time experiencing an emergence of truly “global economic space.” This can be characterized by the mobility of capital, “and the multi- and trans-nationalisation of production. It is these developments that are said to compromise the agency of public authorities and, thereby, promote particular types of (convergent) neoliberal policy response” (Rosamond 3). In this sense globalization, due to its open nature and the mobility of goods and capital, has a profound impact on the policies of the EU.

Some feel the economic view of globalization is too narrow, but Indian economist Amartya Sen said, “globalisation is neither new nor a folly, but a global movement of ideas, people, technology, and goods from one region to others, benefiting the people at large” (The Indian Express). Globalization has been occurring in Europe in different forms since the Crusades. Using Sen’s definition, the effects of globalization on the European economy, and particularly on the European Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), may be discussed. The CAP was created in the 1950s as a way to ensure stable food production throughout Europe in the post-war reconstruction period. It acted as one of the original pieces of major legislation that began Europeanization. By the 1990s, the emphasis of the CAP shifted toward production limits and promoting environmentally sound farming, changes known as the MacSharry reforms. But in the early 21st century, the competitiveness of European agriculture produced a need for “a rural development policy encouraging many rural initiatives while also helping farmers to restructure their farms, to diversify and to improve their product marketing” (European Commission, Agricultural and Rural Development). The CAP generates funds to ensure that farmers are not paid just to produce food, but also to create income stability and protect tax payers. This encroachment into the agricultural policies of the sovereign member states, however, has created many problems despite its noticeable benefits.

II. The Question of Nationality

One major objection to globalization and Europeanization is the idea that they challenge the national methods for deciding on policies and national forms of government. Hay and Rosamond question whether the European Union’s policies are the best approach to meeting the challenges of globalization: “Similarly, in European Union policy circles, we find the argument that globalisation presents a series of devastating challenges to established national modes of governance and moreover that a neoliberal variant of integration is the most viable form of engagement with the new global economic imperatives” (2). Their assertions are noticeably vulnerable to challenges from empirical evidence. However, it is apparent that forms of welfare cutbacks are occurring throughout Europe, and market integration and ‘Europeanisation’ are continuing.

When valuing the merits of Europeanization, it is important to examine the natural reaction of states to EU policies. Europeanization is a part of the EU agenda. Throughout the

fifty years of its existence, gradual integration has been one of the keys to the EU's longevity and success. It has also challenged the boundaries of nationalism and state loyalty. Changes that were made to national policies through European policies tested the patience and faith of all EU citizens. For example, restrictions on goods that are still sold but are no longer readily available and on those items which may be sold at all affect daily life in every member-state.

Technology has been a particularly important vehicle for globalization and, consequently, agricultural, societal, and economic advancement. Technology presents new possibilities for greater efficiency in performing tasks of all kinds. Technology increases not only efficiency but also output and potential for diversification of goods and services. In conjunction with technology, science plays a critical role in the process of globalization. Doctor Bokias argues that science

creates sustainable agricultural production systems which strike the right balance between competitiveness and the other elements of sustainability. In the competitive and sustainable agri-food sector there is a reflection of consumer demands and needs of society in an open world market. [And] a knowledge based agri-economy provides tools for policy makers and economic decision takers. (3)

Science and technology are important to globalization because they affect the global market and policies made for trade and agricultural production and appropriations.

The initial objectives set out in Article 39 of the Treaty of Rome include increasing productivity by encouraging technical advancement. The Treaty also ensured the most advantageous use of the factors of production, in particular labor, by securing accessibility of supplies, guaranteeing a reasonable standard of living for the agricultural community, stabilizing markets, and providing consumers with food at modest prices. As Kydd, Dorward, and Poulton state, "Yield increases are largely achieved by the use of more inputs: fertilizer, pesticides, irrigation water and energy for pumps and tillage machinery" (5). Yield is then directly linked with technological advancements, which Article 39 promotes. When it became apparent that the EU was overproducing, they were forced to amend the CAP so that all farmers were receiving land stewardship subsidies, and were, in effect, paid not to farm. In both instances new technologies in farming which were developed worldwide, such as fertilizers and equipment that help growth and ecological approaches like organic farming, were put into use in the European system. This new input aided the agricultural process.

Globalization allows for the enhancement of agricultural competitiveness. New biotechnology and breeding techniques aid in "growing of crops with lower production costs, increased eco-efficiency, and a greater added value" (Bokias 5). The integration of technological developments, such as information technology, also achieves this effect. Diversification and non-food bio-materials create "new or improved biological raw materials, meeting industrial food and non-food requirements, including bio-energy. [More] efficient farming practices reduce costs and/or offer environmental benefits akin to low chemical inputs and better crop rotation" (Bokias 5). In addition to this, Bokias argues that efficient animal production systems develop advances in diagnostic tests, risk assessment, surveillance systems, and animal welfare (5).

III. Globalization and European Integration

The recent enlargement of the EU to include the Central and Eastern European countries (Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Cyprus, Malta, Bulgaria, and Romania) was, in itself, a form of globalization through Europeanization. Increasing the scope of the EU was a commitment to promote and diversify integration

with peoples once thought too different ever to be completely incorporated into the European ideal. Fritz Breuss, a professor at the Wirtschaftsuniversität at Wien, points out that older EU members are already making sacrifices, leading to considerable changes in the EU program. "The Agenda 2000 excludes an increase of the own resources from the presently 1.27 percent of GDP" (15). An increase in resources taken from GDP means that the costs of enlargement have to be paid by the fifteen EU member states established before the most recent accessions. The costs then come by saving transfers from the CAP and the structural funds. Reforming these two policy areas causes those countries "which were net receivers out of the EU budget...to bear a higher burden as the so-called net payers" (Breuss 15). This need to change to accommodate new members illustrates the fact that enlargement and integration inevitably lead to reform of the European Union's key policy areas, the CAP being one of the most significant.

Globalization creates increased competition, not only between outside nations and the EU, but also within the European Economic Area. Despite the advantages, however, this also creates economic problems. As Kydd, Dorward, and Poulton say, "for the rural poor in particular, the costs of accessing the new economic opportunities created by globalisation may be very high or, indeed, prohibitive" (14). Poorer European nations can not afford to keep up with larger, richer ones, especially since they receive a smaller share of the CAP. In some areas, globalization is challenging the "conventional wisdom about economies of scale in smallholder agriculture due to issues of transaction costs and market access" (Kydd, Dorward, and Poulton 17).

From a transactions cost point-of-view, the true benefits of a small-holder farm are found in the coordination of labor capital. There are, however, some critical areas that must also be identified. Kydd, Dorward, and Poulton (17) state that small farms are more liable to have high unit transaction costs in input and output markets. This happens because of fixed costs in exploratory actions through probability experiments. Also, they may not be able to utilize economies of scale when using draft animals or power technology such as tillers and pumps. These smaller farms are unable to keep up with the costs of new technology and have a major disadvantage in integrated Europe.

In addition to this, small farm owners endure severe disadvantages in credit markets. These credit disadvantages have not commonly been resolved by attempted policy interventions and do not help poor farmers under trade liberalization.

In many parts of the world and points in history the labour coordination advantages of the smallholder farm household have outweighed its disadvantages in other respects. However, as agriculture intensifies, the balance of advantages changes, as even small farms are driven to make more use of input, credit and output markets and also rising labour costs encourage substitution of power machinery for labour (power machinery is likely to have economies of scale). (Kydd, Dorward, and Poulton 17)

In some cases, as Kydd, Dorward, and Poulton explain, this propensity may be hastened by global inclinations toward sources of higher priced horticulture and floriculture in developing countries. Buyers then specify standards requirements that can most successfully be attained with the expert supervision and control of more large-scale ventures.

The European price-support policy, involving the price of excess products, raised problems in international business relationships between Europe and the United States. MacSherry's "set-aside" reform plan for European crops of 1992 raised ethical problems toward society and the developing countries where people continued to starve. Payments were set aside to limit production and encourage reforestation. In both instances, problems were a consequence of globalization.

It should be noted that while there are downsides for small, family-owned farms, there

actually may be some benefits. Though these small farms cannot compete with the larger conglomerates, this system frees up resources for other more productive uses. Without being able to provide unique products small farms will fail. While this can be disruptive in the short-term, in the long run the labor, land, and capital can be put to greater uses. From a global production and efficiency standpoint, this would be a good thing. The CAP is supposed to protect small farmers from suffering due to unregulated globalization, and yet they still cannot keep up with the larger farms. Conceivably, greater efficiency of resources will cause gains from trade to rise. Rather than being paid not to farm, this might motivate small farm owners to enter other areas of lucrative employment, thus furthering economic growth.

Europeans, even members of the farming industry, are willing to pay a considerable price in order to continue their traditional culture, and protecting small farms with the CAP is an important part of that. This means that while globalization is bound to keep moving forward, it will be regulated by agricultural protection at various levels. As Phillip Gordon of Yale University said, “The EU will eventually have to scale back its agricultural protection, but Europeans expect the EU to manage that process without causing the pain associated with living in an entirely unregulated world.” Whether or not the structural funds will be able to counterbalance any losses to the owners of small farms remains to be seen.

Even though the European Union inherently supports integration and globalization, there is an element that rejects incorporation. Maria Di Giacomo remarks that, “In the last decade the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has rediscovered the importance of regional territory and press for a definition and an individuation of cultural and geographical peculiarities, which give incentives and investments” (6). Nevertheless, as she explains, several countries belonging to the European Union continue to observe the EU from a production point of view.

Post-1945 institution-building in Western Europe may have supported the creation of a European Economic Area, but Dr. Rosamond points out that it would disregard the work of scores of economic historians to propose that the assimilation of the European economy began with the initiation of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951. It has been a long process built over centuries. Dr. Rosamond believes that “Globalisation is good because it delivers the efficient allocation of resources on a world scale. Policies that support globalization (developed and delivered at both national and supranational levels of governance) are thus desirable because long run prosperity will accrue for the European economy, European firms and European citizens” (8). He clarifies that the establishment of the EU has been a long process that started with ties among states long before the formal institutions were put in place. As a result of this prior integration, it could be difficult to judge just how globalization affects Europe.

IV. Euroscepticism

In a simple context, “globalisation is precisely all about the increasing *irrelevance* of territorial units (most notably nation-states and national economies) and the transcendence of a fixed Westphalian geography” (Rosamond 5). National sovereignty and loss thereof has always been a contentious subject in the EU. Most closely associated with this is the concept of “Euroscepticism,” a term coined when scholars in the UK became concerned that the ever-closer union of the Treaty of Rome would detract from the national sovereignty of Great Britain. Euroscepticism is the idea that European integration is bad on various levels for nation states that wish to retain national sovereignty; as a result, all plans for further integration should be abandoned. Economically, skepticism (strongest in countries such as the UK which fear loss of too much sovereignty) comes from the fact that the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) has been unevenly applied, something Rosamond refers to when discussing European integration. The SGP was meant to be a force for discipline and to maintain the European

Monetary Union, yet Ministers in charge of applying and enforcing the SGP have failed to bring sanctions against France and Germany. On the contrary, it has begun proceedings against Portugal, whose average debt is usually around the same as Germany and France and is minimal, as well as Greece, whose debt has recently been among the largest in the EU. Euroscepticism also tends to be issue-appropriate for each state. For example, Norway's euroscepticism centers on the EU's common fisheries policy which has the potential to be very damaging to Norway's economy.

The major issues for Eurosceptics are the Rapid Reaction Force, an extension of Euro-pol; the creation of Eurojust, a European Public Prosecutor; the EU Constitution; and the harmonization of taxation and welfare policies. While the EU does not have its own military, the Rapid Reaction Force was designed to answer immediate military threats. So far, the EU has been unsuccessful in formally establishing this force, though there are plans to do so by 2010. Eurojust has been established, but the Lisbon Treaty which would allow for a European Public Prosecutor has not yet been ratified by all member states. The Constitution needed unanimous approval to be accepted as law, but was defeated in France and the Netherlands and replaced by the less intrusive Lisbon Treaty. This assuaged most Eurosceptics. Taxation and welfare have long been harmonized, but the high taxes caused in part by welfare programs that infringe on national sovereignty still receive scrutiny from skeptics.

In the long-term, Rosamond (8) posits, the effects of globalization are good and some negative short-term effects may be worth incurring for the long-term benefits. The perception emerging from the Directorates General of Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities (DGESAE0) is that it is necessary not to portray globalization as intrinsically harmful. Yet Rosamond (9) discusses how the DGESAE0 emphasizes issues such as the relatively high rates of unemployment, poverty, inequality, and differences in social and economic rights (in a context of economic change outside the model) in certain areas, particularly Eastern Europe. All of these factors may have long-term effects on countries' integration into the EU.

As of now, the ten accession states that joined the EU in 2004 and the two that joined in 2007 enjoy very little of the guaranteed free movement of labor and the economic benefits that are supposed to come with membership. These 12 states will not be allowed to officially use the common currency for several more years. Migrant workers are denied the ability to look for work in many of the Western states because these countries fear that the large poor populations of countries like Poland will enter their states and take low-wage jobs from their own people.

According to Adam Luedtke of European Union Politics, "In a...Eurobarometer survey, respondents from across the EU ranked the importance of immigration higher than terrorism, pensions, taxation, education, housing, the environment, public transport, defense and foreign affairs" (14). Essentially, disallowing these countries access to free labor movement and promoting concerns about immigration are a denial of the rights of European citizens living in them. This denial is justified under the guise that they are not yet ready to complete this part of their integration but that it should happen gradually. Luedtke states that, "the spectacular political divergence between mandate and results presents a puzzle: why has harmonization of immigration policies been so elusive, if such harmonization is seen as necessary for the EU to become a single market with free movement of labour?" (3). He explains that the answer must lie with national politics since at various times, harmonization proposals offered by member states, or by one of the EU's governing organizations, have been blocked by other member states. How long can the newer members afford to wait for the long-term benefits of globalization and integration? And to what detriment of the whole European Union?

Luedtke goes on to state that harmonization of immigration policies is not blocked because of perceived notions of strategic gains or losses but "because the proposed supranationalization of immigration control clashes with historically rooted *national identities*" (3). Some

scholars believe that European integration is an economic consideration and therefore national identity overrides immigration policy. When that is the rationale, national identity can only be considered in a bounded sense, despite the economic implications of immigration. As Sergio Romano wrote:

Europe has a single market, a single currency, a central bank. No member country can build an airport, decide how much milk can be produced by national cows or call something chocolate without consulting Brussels or conforming to the Commission's guidelines. No important merger or acquisition can proceed unless [the] E.U. competition Commissioner...has nodded his approval. But Europe has no minister for the treasury or the economy to provide the governor of the central bank and the business community with a blueprint for Union policy. The countries which signed the Schengen pact have common borders, but they still treat immigration as a national problem, have different quotas, and do not have a common minister of the interior or of justice.

There are clearly problems to the mechanics of European integration. But it is also clear that there have been advantages as well, through stable growth of the Euro, sustainable trade growth, and greater opportunity for political stability.

V. Conclusion

As Dr. Rosamond states, globalization creates peripheral difficulties which are only countered successfully through the application of sound market principles at a supranational, EU level. "In a sense the challenge of neoliberalism is best met with further neoliberalisation. Globalisation is a force for good (almost by definition), but it is most likely to be a force for good only in situations where 'correct' policies are applied" (8). Of particular importance is the manner in which globalization has been interwoven into the dissimilar efforts of what Rosamond calls "norm entrepreneurs." These entrepreneurs rally public opinion through transnational systems of opinion-shapers and policymakers, contributing to the social composition of the European Community as a suitable and realistic economic area populated by distinct European actors (Hay, Watson, and Wincott).

The opening paragraph of the Presidential Conclusions to the Lisbon Special European Council of March 2000 mentions that the European Union is challenged with a quantum shift resulting from globalization and the trials of a modern, knowledge-driven economy. These trials affect every facet of peoples' lives and demand a fundamental alteration of the European economy. The conditions under which agriculture is currently practiced are becoming more and more globalized. Agricultural routines are modified more and more by international policy and choices that are dependent on trade policies, rather than by the uniqueness of the natural environment or by the complexity encountered in prevailing over them by designing inventive cultivation techniques and effective use of new technologies.

Globalization is an important aspect of international business due to its influence on everyday life, and has been made possible by the liberalization of investment and trade. Globalization is not a 'zero-sum game' where various people lose while others gain (Lamy). Though there are drawbacks, and the European system is not running completely smoothly, European integration is slowly proving to have created great benefits, both politically and economically. Rather than a zero-sum game, it is more of a win-win situation, as post-World War II economic history shows. It is and always has been a long-term process, and the full extent of how Europe will benefit from its efforts to integrate is yet to be seen. But Europe has profited extensively from globalization thus far and should continue to do so provided that it maintains its ability

for innovation, its long-term competitiveness, and its social market economy.

Works Cited

- Bokias, Efthimius. Science, Sustainable Agriculture, and Rural Development in the EU. York, UK.
- Breuss, Fritz. Macroeconomic Effects of EU Enlargement for Old and New Members. Vienna University of Economics and Business Administration Research Institute for European Affairs, 2001.
- Cook, Robin. Speech to the Institute of European Affairs. Dublin, Ireland, 3 November 1997.
- Di Giacomo, Maria Gemma Grillotti. The Geographical Renaissance in the Transition of the European Agricultural Policy from the Sectorial to the Territorial Model. Università degli Studi "Roma Tre", Italia, web publication <http://www.gecoagri.it/materiale/agricoltura_en.pdf> circa, 2001-2002.
- European Commission, Agricultural and Rural Development. *The Common Agricultural Policy Explained*. (European Communities, 2007)
- Gordon, Philip H. *Globalization: Europe's Wary Embrace*. YaleGlobal, 1 November, 2004 <<http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4790>>
- Hay, Colin. What Role for Ideas in the Structure-Agency Debate? Globalisation as a Process Without a Subject. Paper presented at the conference of the British International Studies Association, University of Manchester, 1999.
- Hay, Colin and Ben Rosamond. Globalisation, European Integration and the Discursive Construction of Economic Imperatives: A Question of Convergence? Queen's Papers on Europeanisation No. 1/2001 2001.
- Hay, Colin, Matthew Watson, and Daniel Wincott. Globalisation, European Integration and the Persistence of European Social Models. Birmingham, UK: POLSIS University of Birmingham, 1999.
- The Indian Express. Embrace Globalisation with Vigour, Says Sen, 2001.
- Kydd, Jonathan, Andrew Dorward, and Colin Poulton. Globalisation and its Implications for the Natural Resources Sector: A Closer Look at the Role of Agriculture in the Global Economy. Winchester, UK: The Department for International Development Rural Livelihoods and Environment Department Natural Resources Advisers' Conference, 2000.
- Lamy, Pascal. Globalisation: a win-win process. Brussels, Belgium: speech 15 September, 1999.
- Luedtke, Adam. European Integration, Public Opinion and Immigration Policy: Testing the Impact of National Identity. Sage Publications *European Union Politics* 2005; 6; 83.
- MacGillivray, Alex. A Brief History of Globalization. London, UK: Robinson, Constable and Robinson Ltd., 2006.
- Presidential Conclusions, Lisbon Special European Council, 23/4 March, 2000.
- Romano, Sergio. The European Conundrum. Time, in conjunction with CNN publication, 2000.
- Rosamond, Dr Ben. Globalisation and the European Union. Paper presented to conference on *The European Union in International Affairs*, National Europe Centre, Australian National University, 2002.

[alumni feature]

Standing Up for Charity

Standing Up for Charity

By *JEFFREY M. JONES*

When *Who Really Cares* was first released in late 2006 the political right greeted it as a bombshell exposing the widely-held, yet fraudulent, belief that liberals are more compassionate than conservatives. As Arthur C. Brooks states early on, “The data tell us that the conventional wisdom is dead wrong. In most ways, political conservatives are not personally less charitable than political liberals—they are more so.”

This “surprising truth” was good for headlines and good for the conservative soul—a long overdue response to bleeding-heart liberals who caricatured those on the right as greedy, uncaring, and callous to the needs of the poor.

Unfortunately, in their zeal to publicize the hypocrisy of the left, conservative reviewers often downplayed the most important findings of the book, the “Why It Matters” stuff. I believe Brooks when, at the end of his introduction, he writes, “This book does not seek to bash all liberals...rather, the purpose here is to make the point that charity matters, and that we need to understand better what stimulates it.”

Putting aside partisan politics, let’s find out what makes charity—personal voluntary sacrifice for the good of another person—tick.

Giving Rightly Understood

To answer the question, “What stimulates charity?” Brooks, a RAND educated economist and professor of public administration at Syracuse University, has gone to great lengths compiling, sifting, and analyzing information from 10 survey-based

datasets. His forthright conclusion is that certain beliefs and behaviors positively affect how often and how much people give. The four forces he identifies are religion, skepticism about the government’s role in economic life, personal entrepreneurship, and strong families. The antithesis is equally true: “Secularism, forced income redistribution, welfare, and family breakdown are all phenomena implicated in depressing the levels of money charity, volunteering, and informal acts of generosity.” The data are compelling.

“Religious people,” defined as those who regularly attend a house of worship, are 25 percentage points more likely to give than secularists (91 to 66 percent). They also give more money as a portion of their income, are more likely to volunteer (67 to 44 percent), and volunteer more often. This may not come as a surprise given that religiously-motivated individuals make a habit of supporting their churches, synagogues, and mosques. But Brooks found that religious people are also more charitable in non-religious ways. They are “10 points more likely than secularists to give money to non-religious charities, and 21 points more likely to volunteer for completely secular causes.” The evidence is clear: people of faith take seriously the virtue of charity.

People who favor government redistribution of income are less charitable than skeptics of these policies. In one survey, Americans who disagreed with the statement, “The government has a responsibility to reduce income inequality,” were more likely to give money to charity and gave four times as much per year than those who agreed. A personal inclination towards redis-

tribution suppresses private giving, and in the same way “government spending on charitable causes leads people to give less to charity.” This phenomenon, Brooks points out, is well known to economists as the “public goods crowding out effect.” As an example, his research suggests that if a state were to increase its spending on Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) by 10 percent, it would likely see a decrease in charitable giving of 3 percent.

Personal entrepreneurship is the third force identified as stimulating charity. The findings here are two-fold. First, people who work hard and earn more money—those with higher incomes—tend to give more money to charity. “Households with total wealth exceeding \$1 million (about 7 percent of the American population) give about half of all charitable donations.” The drive to earn a living appears to drive up giving. Second, being poor doesn’t mean you can’t be generous. In fact, as a percentage of their income the poor give more than both the middle class *and* the rich. This too is related to entrepreneurship because some poor people are more charitable than others. Holding income constant, among families that make \$14,000 annually, “the working poor family gives more than three times as much money to charity as the welfare family.” Earned income, as opposed to unearned or redistributed income, makes giving easier.

Finally, charity, it turns out, is a natural family value. As many married couples and parents can attest, strong families are the byproduct of sacrifice and love. When charity is practiced in the home its benefits are experienced firsthand and likely influence behavior outside the home. “In 2002, 85 percent of married parents donated money to charity, compared with 76 percent of divorced parents, and 56 percent of single parents. Volunteering showed even greater disparities.” Generous parents are role models to their children; kids who see their parents volunteering are 18 points more likely to volunteer as an adult than kids whose parents did not volunteer. And American society as a whole, studies show, receives large and posi-

tive benefits from childbearing, which is why birth rates are such an important indicator of national wellbeing.

You Get What You Give

If the above mentioned forces are valid, then public policies that help strengthen families, encourage work, discourage notions of redistribution, and acknowledge the importance of religion, will be on the right side of standing up for charity. Of course, this implies that charity is a value worth promoting in our society. With hints and tips along the way, Brooks offers a compelling case for the good that can come of charity.

To begin with, many scholars, philosophers, and theologians argue that “charity is a crucial factor in the prosperity—financial and nonfinancial—of the givers themselves, not just the recipients of their charity.” Charitable acts may increase industriousness and strengthen social networks in such a way that the giver gets back more than they put in. Brooks takes it a step further using statistical methodology to show that “charity pushes up income—but income increases charity as well. Money giving and prosperity exist in positive feedback to each other—a virtuous cycle, you might say.”

More readily apparent is the notion that giving and volunteerism are correlated with happiness and good health. “People who give money charitably are 43 percent more likely to say they are “very happy” than non-givers, [and] volunteers are 42 percent more likely than nonvolunteers to say they are very happy.” Brooks also cites psychiatrist Victor E. Frankl’s classic work *Man’s Search for Meaning* to show how charity can bring purpose into a person’s life and improve mental health. Research studies consistently affirm that acts of charity and volunteering can counter depression, lower blood pressure, and improve the immune system, among many other benefits.

“Evidence suggests that charity is also a crucial element in our ability to gov-

ern ourselves as free people.” Here Brooks is articulating what Alexis de Toqueville and countless other political theorists have put forth as one of the key strengths of American democracy—our civic engagement. Whether one is referring to mediating structures, social networks, or voluntary associations, an active citizenry can hold government in check and ensure a freer, more democratic society. And how are these civic groups sustained? “In no small part, through charity. Private gifts of money and time provide the primary support for American churches, community organizations, and many nonprofits.”

Knowing what stimulates charity and why it matters allows us to evaluate

public policy measures in a new light—one focused on improving life for us all. We must be willing to have our assumptions challenged and follow the data wherever they lead. And if that proves too difficult, start volunteering and giving money away. The resulting prosperity, health, and happiness in your own life may lead you to support public policies consistent with the call of charity.

Jeffrey M. Jones is a research fellow and an assistant director at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He graduated from Pepperdine’s School of Public Policy in 2002.

Who Really Cares

The Surprising Truth About Compassionate Conservatism:

America’s Charity Divide—Who Gives, Who Doesn’t, and Why It Matters

by Arthur C. Brooks

Basic Books, 256 pp., \$26

[commentary]

**Poking the Russian Bear:
The European Missile Defense Shield**

**Corporate Environmentalists:
Green Business Strategy**

**Barack Obama:
Same Story, New Character**

Poking the Russian Bear: The European Missile Defense Shield

By *JEREMY ANDERSON*

In December 1991 Mikhail Gorbachev resigned, the hammer and sickle was lowered for the last time over Moscow, and the USSR was dissolved. For the first time in four decades America and Russia breathed a sigh of relief—the Cold War was over. Apparently though, Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin never got the memo.

Russian/U.S. relations have declined during the past two years, to the point that some scholars, such as Ariel Cohen, have labeled the current situation a “cool war.”¹ Both leaders predictably point the finger at the other for this “cooling.” In truth, both leaders are to blame.

The Bush Administration’s dogged insistence on the European Missile Shield, a costly program of marginal operational ability and marginal necessity, provokes Russia, and is reminiscent of the Cold War mindset. Putin frequently voices his displeasure with this proposed shield, but when he states that, “[It is] too early to speak of an end to the arms race”² as he did in a 2006 speech, his rhetoric sounds like he lifted it from the old Soviet playbook.

In addition to the rhetoric, Russia’s recent actions too often mirror that of the Soviet era. Putin portrays Russia as a facilitator of peace, a leader of the global community, and a promoter of human rights and democracy. This is a difficult pill to swallow. This is, after all, the same “democratic” Russia that recently turned off gas and oil supplies to Estonia, Ukraine, and Belarus; fomented unrest in Georgia; violently crushed its Chechen population; threatened to aim its nuclear missiles at points from Paris to

Kiev; and has begun probing NATO defenses with its long-range bombers. Compared with the Soviet era, this may be a kinder, gentler Russian bear, but it is a bear nonetheless—a fact U.S. policymakers should not forget.

Although American officials publicly deny that they are implementing the European Missile Shield with Russia in mind, the proposed shield is to some extent, it seems, a response to Russia’s recent actions. In truth, the shield is only the newest wrinkle in a long line of disagreements between the two countries regarding eastward NATO expansion.

Russia, per its most recent National Security Concept, views both eastward expansion of NATO and the positioning of military contingents near its borders as a threat. According to Russia’s views, NATO expansion is not, as the West claims, the means to promoting values of stability, personal liberty, democracy, and peace. It is instead an explicit attempt to weaken Russia and threaten its security. After all, NATO by its very nature is a collective defense alliance. To mask it as something else is an affront to Russia’s intelligence, or so Russia avers.

Moscow can decry NATO expansion all it likes, but it has no legitimate right to prevent it. The Warsaw Pact is long dead, and sovereign countries are entitled to petition for entrance into NATO and the security it provides. Russia can, however, argue against NATO establishing military installations in new NATO member states. In 1997, the “Founding Act on Mutual Relations” stipulated that NATO would not station *permanent and substantial combat forces* in new member states. Furthermore, NATO secu-

rity arrangements would not infringe upon the sovereign rights of other states and shall take into account their *legitimate security concerns*.³

Moscow alleges that the United States' attempt to place a missile defense shield in Poland as well as a complimentary radar base in the Czech Republic is a breach of this contract. The United States counters with the semantic argument that one missile defense shield, although permanent, is hardly substantial, nor does this shield constitute a legitimate security concern for Russia as it is too small to undermine Russia's ballistic missile capabilities.

In 2007, Putin remarked, "If a new missile defense system will be deployed in Europe, then we need to warn you today that we will come with a response."⁴ Putin later threatened to aim the Russian nuclear arsenal towards European targets. The United States, never one to be bullied, pushed forward and inked an "agreement in principle" with Poland to place the shield in Polish territory. Russia, never one to limit its displeasure to the rhetoric realm, buzzed a U.S. aircraft carrier in response—twice.

Not only does this shield have deleterious effects on Russian-American relations, but the U.S. Congress has also criticized it for its sizeable price tag of \$76-\$110 billion and inconsistent results.⁵

The Missile Defense Agency's Ground Based Missile Defense (GMD) tests have yielded mixed results. The theory behind this defense is that an incoming enemy missile will hit the interceptor missile's "kill vehicle" and explode upon impact. Tests so far have raised doubts about the effectiveness of this method—almost as many missiles get past the kill vehicle as collide with it. As of May 2007, only five out of nine tests were a success.⁶ Defense experts often remark that this type of defense is like "hitting a bullet with a bullet."⁷

Furthermore, critics argue that these tests are attempting to hit a bullet with a bullet under ideal and controlled—and therefore optimum—circumstances. Tests are conducted with the "defender" knowing

the time of attack, the type of attacking missile, its trajectory and intended target, and the makeup of its payload. This is not information an enemy would conveniently disclose. The Pentagon's Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation released a statement in January 2006, which cautioned that the "flight tests still lack operational realism."⁸

The other problem facing the missile shield is that enemies can deploy counter-decoys to fool the missile shield. The simplest way to foil the shield is to overwhelm it by firing more missiles than the defense can intercept. The enemy could also deploy replica decoys, disguise the warhead among debris from the exploded booster rocket, jam the signaling radar, and more.

The Patriot Ground Based System is the one missile defense system that has worked, albeit not always to perfection. Designed to protect U.S. troops from Iraqi Scuds, the Patriot Defense System got off to an ignominious start in the Persian Gulf War. It failed in most or all of its Scud engagements even though the enemy employed no obvious counter-measures. In Desert Storm, the U.S. Army fired 158 Patriot missiles at 47 Scud missiles but "hit no more than four, and possibly hit none."⁹ It performed significantly better in 2003's Operation Iraqi Freedom, intercepting all enemy missiles within range. Unfortunately, it also intercepted a British RAF Tornado, a Navy F-18, and an Airforce F-16, killing three pilots.

Even if the missile shield worked properly the United States and NATO have not presented a convincing argument as to why it is necessary. U.S. officials insist the shield is intended to protect American interests and allies from rogue states, and even then, could only prevent a limited attack of one or two "unsophisticated" missiles. The European missile shield could not defend the continent against a large-scale attack like the one Russia could launch—a point U.S. officials willingly concede. NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer is of like mind: "Ten interceptors cannot and will not

affect the strategic balance and 10 interceptors can also not pose a threat to Russia.”¹⁰

These statements have done little to assuage Moscow’s fears. Russia is confident that it could overwhelm one shield right now. It is, however, worried that one shield will open the door to an entire global system of shields that would undermine its nuclear capabilities. U.S. officials insist, at least publicly, that they have no plans for a global missile defense system. The most recent U.S. National Security Strategy explicitly states that the missile shield is designed to protect its European allies from a nuclear threat from rogue states, specifically Iran and North Korea.¹¹

Putin is not buying this claim. The Kremlin believes that Russia, not Iran, is the target of this shield because Iran does not have nuclear missile capabilities—a point substantiated by the recent National Intelligence Estimate.¹² As Putin remarked, “We are being told the anti-missile defense system is targeted against something that does not exist. Doesn’t it seem funny to you?”¹³

The U.S. intelligence community is not laughing; it believes Iran’s ballistic missile inventory is among the largest in the Middle East. Iran possesses several hundred foreign short range Scud-B and Scud-C missiles, as well as their own Zelzal, Samid, and Fateh missiles. The centerpiece of their ballistic missile effort is the Shahab-3, which supposedly has a range of 1200m, placing Israel and southeastern Europe easily within reach. It is also rumored that Iran possess the Shahab-5 (2,500 mile range), and an ICBM dubbed Kowsar.¹⁴

If Iran were to fire these missiles, and we are to believe Iranian Presidents Rafsanjani and Ahmadinejad, Israel would be a more likely target than Europe. A missile shield in Poland, though, would not protect Israel. Since Iran is much closer to Israel than Poland the interceptor missile would never reach Iran’s missile in time. The proposed shield would not even protect fellow NATO member Turkey.

It is also unclear how a European

Missile Shield would protect America’s allies from North Korean missiles. North Korea has become markedly less menacing in recent months since Pyongyang promised to dismantle the country’s nuclear program. North Korea may not possess nuclear weapons but it does possess short-range missiles, which it demonstrated by firing a Taepodong-1 over Japan’s bow in 1998.

It is also widely believed that North Korea possesses a long-range Taepodong-2 that is capable of reaching the United States. This would be less worrisome if Kim Jong-Il had not threatened a “relentless, annihilating strike” in response to any U.S. preemptive strike against his missiles, which he conveniently likes to test without diverging the flight trajectory or landing zone.¹⁵ Still, it is unclear how a missile shield in Europe protects the American continent, or America’s ally Japan, from a North Korean missile.

Furthermore, if a rogue state wanted to detonate a weapon of mass destruction (WMD) in Europe, it would not likely choose to deliver this weapon via ballistic missiles, even if it had the capability. Sending a missile is the equivalent of sending a calling card. In this age of terrorism, missiles are not the weapon of choice because it is too easy to link the missile back to the offending agent(s). Car bombs, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), airplanes, and rocket-propelled grenades are the preferred weapons. The missile defense shield would be useless against these types of attacks.

The United States’ dogged insistence on this European shield is troubling. America is spending billions of dollars per year on a system that may or may not work, to guard against a threat that likely does not exist. What is known for certain, though, is that this missile shield is provoking Russia at a time when the United States can ill afford another enemy.

Other actions can deter a rogue country from firing a missile at U.S. targets. Ultimately, humanity, not technology, will act as the greatest deterrent against potential enemies. As former Assistant Secretary of De-

fense Philip Coyle remarked, "Dollar for dollar, [our diplomats] are the most cost-effective missile defense system the United States ever had."¹⁶ Americans should take comfort because this approach has worked before. After all, diplomacy, not a preventative military strike, brought the Cuban missile crisis to an end. Likewise, the Cold War was not won solely through arms races, military displays of force and proxy wars. Diplomacy was equally as important in achieving victory.

Russia, more than ever, is an important ally for the United States. The United States needs Russia to stay within the fold and not facilitate Iran's nuclear ambitions. It also needs Russia's help in the War on Terror, especially as the North Caucasus and Central Asia have become more radicalized. The United States should look for ways to engage Russia, not enrage it.

Unfortunately, this is what the European missile shield, a costly program of marginal necessity and marginal operational

ability, is doing. America should abandon this pursuit as a sign of good faith towards the Russian Federation. Currently, there is no need for such a shield and, ironically, building the shield may actually necessitate the need for one, a classic example of the security dilemma. This is a point too many policy makers and politicians have overlooked. Rudy Giuliani, for one, recently remarked, "The best answer to Putin would be a substantial increase in the size of our military."¹⁷

A military buildup is the wrong approach. It was precisely this military one-ups-manship that fueled the Cold War in the first place. And despite what Bush and Putin may believe, the Cold War is over—the United States won, it does not need to fight it again. Abandoning the European Missile Shield is one way to prevent the return of another Cold War. American children already have to remove their shoes at the airport; should they really have to practice the duck-and-cover under their desks again?

Endnotes

¹ Ariel Cohen, *The New Cool War?*, Benador Associates, May 17, 2006.

<http://www.benadorassociates.com/article/19497>

² Vladimir Putin, "Annual Address to the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation", May 10, 2006.

http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/speeches/2006/05/10/1823_type70029type82912_105566.shtml

³ *Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation*, NATO On-line Library, May 27, 1997.

<http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/fndact-a.htm>

⁴ *Nuclear Stakes Rise Ahead of G8*, SkyNews, June 4, 2007.

<http://news.sky.com/skynews/article/0,,30200-1268857,00.html?f=rss>

⁵ Estimates through year 2015 for a two-site system, including operational costs. *Fully Deployed Missile Defense System Could Cost up to \$1 Trillion, Study Says*, Inside Missile Defense, January 8, 2003.

<http://disarmament.un.org/advisoryboard/pdf/imd8jan2003.pdf>

⁶ Jim Wolf, *U.S. Scraps Missile Defense Test as Missile Misfires*, Reuters, May 25, 2007.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSWAT00758820070525?pageNumber=1&virtualBrandChannel=0>

⁷ *Kill Vehicle Misses Again*, U.S. Government Info, July 8, 2000.

<http://usgovinfo.about.com/library/news/aa070800a.htm>

⁸ *The Limits and Liabilities of Missile Defense*, Center for Defense Information, November 15, 2006.

<http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=3725>

⁹ Philip E. Coyle, *The Limits and Liabilities of Missile Defense*, Center for Defense Information, November 15, 2006.

<http://www.cdi.org/friendlyversion/printversion.cfm?documentID=3725>

¹⁰ *NATO Chief Dismisses Russia Fears*, BBC News, April 19, 2007.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6570533.stm>

¹¹ *United States National Security Strategy*, White House, 2006.

<http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf>

¹² Greg Bruno and Sharon Otterman, *National Intelligence Estimates*, Council on Foreign Relations, May 14, 2008.

<http://www.cfr.org/publication/7758/#8>

¹³ *NATO Condemns Putin Missile Vow*, BBC News, June 4, 2007.

<http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6719507.stm>

¹⁴ Ilan Berman, *Tehran Rising* (UK: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2005) 60.

¹⁵ *U.S. Officials: North Korea Tests Long Range Missile*, CNN.com, July 5, 2006.

<http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/07/04/korea.missile/index.html>

¹⁶ Coyle.

¹⁷ *Giuliani Advocates Military Build-up to Counter Putin*, CNN.com, December 1, 2007. <http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2007/12/01/giuliani-advocates-military-build-up-to-counter-putin/>

Corporate Environmentalists: Green Business Strategy

By *DANIELLE BERSEN*

The era of the green-conscious consumer has begun, and companies are eager to grab a share of the market. The effective environmental policy maker need not have an office on the Hill or a seat in the EPA, but rather an office in a corporation or seat as a CEO. Green corporations, manufacturing, investment, and innovation will bring about the next great industrial revolution of our time and will serve not only as a platform for a cleaner environment, but also as a worldwide economic stimulus.

Corporate eco-efficiency demonstrates the duality of benefits from both economic prosperity and ecological protection, which articulates that “A clean environment is actually good for business, for it connotes happy and healthy workers, profits for companies developing conservation technologies or selling green products... and efficiency in material usage.”¹ Therefore, it behooves companies to implement green policies in their business strategy that improve the livelihood of their consumers, producers, and ultimately their own bottom line.

Green Corporate Citizenship

Companies are voluntarily engaging in green corporate citizenship, wherein they make contributions toward a plethora of environmental causes around the globe. For example, the conglomerate Unilever has included environmental protection issues as one of the most pressing corporate strategic challenges of the 21st century. Investment in water-deprived villages in Africa and offsetting global warming are embedded in Unilever’s corporate agenda, because “...helping

such nations wrestle with poverty, water scarcity, and the effects of climate change is vital to staying competitive in coming decades.”²

Corporations are reducing waste and cutting costs by committing to green practices in their office buildings and in their production mechanisms. Pollution translates as “wasteful use of materials ... it is cheaper to tackle environmental problems before they get out of hand and require expensive remedial action.”³ Cutting wasteful costs at the administrative level has a lasting impact on a company’s bottom line. At least three influential corporations have worked to make their buildings more efficient. General Electric, Johnson Controls, and United Technologies each recognize the incentives for conservation, as commercial buildings are responsible for about one-third of the world’s energy consumption.⁴ As the payoff for energy efficient buildings becomes evident others will follow suit.

Big business is recycling waste into marketable products and reselling them to consumers. For example, Wal-Mart recycles used tires and turns them into coat hangers that are sold in their stores. Consumers appreciate the “green” nature of the supply chain and Wal-Mart has turned the huge expenditure of disposing old tires into a profit. Waste is expensive, but recycling turns trash into a commodity and serves as a viable source of income. Such environmental discipline by leading corporations will advance the trend of environmentally conscious business practices for the future.

As more companies increase their transparency and showcase environmental

responsibility, consumers are choosing to invest in green corporations and green IPOs. Environmental practices can yield strategic advantages in an interconnected world of shifting customer loyalties and regulatory regimes, as there is “100 percent overlap between...business drivers and social and environmental interests.”⁵ Moreover, companies realize the financial and consumer losses associated with irresponsible environmental degradation and are adjusting their marketing campaigns accordingly.

Venture capital investments in green technology and innovation are paramount to funding many projects that would have otherwise remained stagnant. According to a recent article from the *UK's Observer*, “Money is pouring into the clean energy sector, which includes renewable forms of electricity generation such as wind, biomass and solar as well as companies involved in energy efficiency and waste treatment.”⁶ The research firm New Energy Finance reported that investment in the clean energy sector increased globally by 41 percent in 2007 to \$117 billion, just over half of which went to new projects. This investment undoubtedly reflects industry’s commitment to engendering the green revolution.

California as a Case Study

The benefits of running a green corporation offer a diverse selection of investment opportunities, ranging from clean water initiatives to investment in clean energy, and most prominently, Cleantech. Cleantech is defined as “innovations that reduce environmental harm and help companies’ bottom lines,” which includes investment in solar power, hydrogen fuel cells and electric cars.⁷ The motivation for Cleantech investment has also become a political economy priority for progressive states, particularly California.

California has aggressively taken the lead in implementing a plan to combat climate change that also secures the state’s high economic status by making significant investments in Cleantech. Governor Schwar-

zenegger has led an unprecedented fight to integrate clean technology into the political economy. He fervently asserts that green technology will be a clean engine for economic growth and that, “We can protect our environment, and we can protect our economy.”⁸ In 2007, nearly \$2 billion—double the previous year—was invested into California’s clean energy sector alone. The governor predicts Cleantech firms will add 100,000 jobs to the economy by 2020.⁹ Next 10 attests that in 2006, California employed 22,000 people in the clean technology sector, more than any other state, and the field is growing exponentially.¹⁰

California is providing an atmosphere conducive to green investment, which plays to America’s innovative strength and ability to transform industry. Companies such as Texas Pacific Group recently led the \$45 billion buyout of the energy firm TXU, axed eight planned coal-fired power stations and instead promised efficiency savings and wind farms. Both Google and the engineering firm Siemens chose California as the place to launch their business divisions that solve environmental and economic problems simultaneously.¹¹ These voluntary eco-efficient policies of energy conservation, environmental investment, and venture capital in green tech innovations reflect the shift of corporate consciousness from anti-regulatory to anxious investment.

Environmental Regulation

Free market mechanisms coupled with green regulation from the federal and state government are both necessary components to augment the success of the emergent green industrial revolution. Environmental regulation will motivate corporate competition, but it must be created in a delicate and articulate manner. The role of government in the environmental movement is twofold; restrict pollution emissions and maximize market incentives for green corporate practice. The government should strike a balance in protecting the environment while allowing freedom of market choice.

Federal regulation is important to ensure that all corporations have uniformity in regulation to maximize the effectiveness of the green movement.

Regulation must carefully establish strict limits on pollution and protect against environmental degradation and wasteful behavior. The price on carbon production will need to be set high and steadily increase to encourage early investment in clean energy. The cap-and-trade system of carbon management must contain heavy penalties and allow the market to efficiently deliver clean alternatives. Companies that choose to reduce carbon emissions early will have the benefit of saving in the long run. For example, the Chicago-based voluntary market for cap-and-trade is currently thriving in anticipation of future regulation.

Regulation must also offer incentives to the private sector in order to facilitate the green corporate responsibility scheme by offering “financial and other support for ‘ecologically efficient’ forms of production.”¹² Incentives can be applied as a “green” tax credit for eco-efficient business practices and investment in green technology; increasing the availability of state and federal “green” grants for start-up ventures; and research and development. In addition, reevaluation of governmental subsidies and the promotion of specifically green subsidies are essential.

The Senate Finance Committee initiated an economic stimulus proposal that explicated a plan for the promotion of renewable energy. Embodied in this legislation are tax breaks worth over \$3 billion over the next 10 years for wind-farm developers, builders of more efficient appliances, and businesses that install fuel cells. The bill also includes smaller tax credits for the construction of energy-efficient homes, production of energy efficient appliances, and residential use of solar panels and clean coal production.¹³ This economic stimulus bill is unique in that it contains specific benefits for environmental endeavors.

Although a step in the right direc-

tion, the economic stimulus package should have focused exclusively on significant green initiatives, not on sweeping economic stimulus aimed at every economic sector. One forecasted problem with the green incentives in this type of stimulus package is that they require frequent re-authorization, “which industry executives complain makes planning and investment difficult.”¹⁴ The ingenuity of business needs to be fortified by stable environmental policy, while allowing individual companies the flexibility to incorporate green practices into their corporate agendas. Furthermore, the market will need reinforced regulatory security to sustain investment and encourage universal corporate compliance.

Looking Forward

Just as the last industrial revolution became the model for the developing world, so can the green revolution transform the way the world conducts business. The founder of the environmental business-strategy group GreenOrder, Andrew Shapiro puts it this way: “Whatever you are making, if you can add a green dimension to it – making it more efficient, healthier and more sustainable for future generations – you have a product that can’t just be made in India or China...you have to figure out how to integrate green into the DNA of your whole business.”¹⁵ America can claim itself as the leader in green industry by securing regulation and investing in this crucial developing market.

We are at one of the crossroads in history where the assets of big business can advance innovation and responsible investment. This intersection point is a balancing act between the private and public sector. In the coming decade, corporations that do not subscribe to the green movement will lose competitive advantage, proving that both corporate and government environmental policymaking is not only the *right* thing to do, but also the *smart* thing to do.

Endnotes

- ¹ John S. Dryzek and David Schlosberg, eds, Debating the Earth: The Environmental Policy Reader. (Oxford University Press, 2005) 303.
- ² Pete Engardio et. al., *Beyond The Green Corporation*, Business Week January 29, 2008.
- ³ Dryzek and Schlosberg 303.
- ⁴ Jeffrey Kosnett, *Green Investment is the Next Big Thing*, Kiplinger's Personal Finance Magazine, October 2007.
- ⁵ Engardio and Capell.
- ⁶ Tim Webb, *Folding Green: The Investment Boom*, The Observer, February 24, 2008. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/feb/24/greenbusiness.renewableenergy>.
- ⁷ Andrew Edwards, *Governor sees Green Future*, San Bernardino County Sun., February 11, 2008.
- ⁸ Edwards.
- ⁹ Edwards.
- ¹⁰ Edwards.
- ¹¹ Julie Jowit, *California's Burning Ambition*, The Observer, February 17, 2008. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2008/feb/17/greenbusiness.greenpolitics>.
- ¹² Dryzek and Schlosberg 303.
- ¹³ Noam Levey, *Democrats Push 'green' energy tax breaks*, Los Angeles Times, February 5, 2008. <http://www.latimes.com/news/nationworld/nation/la-na-stimulus5feb05.0.5009857.story>.
- ¹⁴ Noam Levey.
- ¹⁵ Thomas Friedman, *The Power of Green*, The New York Times, April 15, 2007.

Barack Obama: Same Story, New Character

By JONATHAN FREINBERG

American voters are “pervasively disgusted with politicians.”¹ They are tired of the professional politician, who, to them, cares only about power. When voters detect political professionalism, they quickly withdraw their support and seek new leadership in those with the opposite reputation. To avoid detection and the stigma of the professional label, many politicians cast themselves as political outsiders. They create a false image that is “planned, created especially to serve a purpose, to make a certain kind of impression.”² They portray themselves as new to the political machine, ‘above the conniving nature of politics’, appearing to be just like you or me.³ However, over time, the American voter learns that these politicians are indeed not outsiders at all.⁴

The image of the outsider, scrutinized carefully, is no different from that of the insider politician, the engineer of consent, who applies “tried practices in the task of getting people to support ideas and programs.”⁵ An engineer of consent works to get as many voters as possible to support him or her, regardless of disparate backgrounds and opinions among voters. He speaks with rhetoric specifically tailored to represent the character and situation of his audience.⁶ He is a professional whose strategy turns voters away from questioning how a political outsider can so adeptly gain their consent. People do not even notice they are accepting what they see as fact, simply on the “credit of testimony or authority of [this] elite.”⁷

Senator Barack Obama fits this mold; in fact, he is a master of the science. Obama is an engineer of consent and not the outsider politician he purports to be. He de-

picts himself as a political outsider, identified in the media and by his own accounts. Revealing instances of contextualization, repetition of specific themes, and pseudo-event application in the Senator’s keynote speech in Selma, Alabama for the *Voting Rights March Commemoration* proves this assertion. It is important to remember that “man’s reflexes, are as the psychologists say, ‘conditioned’. And, therefore he responds quite readily to a glass egg, a decoy duck, a stuffed shirt, or a political platform.”⁸

Contextualization

Contextualization artificially transforms situations from low-context to high-context. A low-context situation occurs when the message is more important than the speaker.⁹ A high-context situation exists when the speaker is just as or more important than the message.¹⁰ In the case of the latter, politicians create an atmosphere that the average American would find at the dinner table, where “once a relationship...form [s], loyalty is never questioned.”¹¹ The speaker then need not be specific because trust is implicit. Obama creates such a high context frame in Alabama “that facilitates and simplifies matters and makes it possible to take advantage of what the person already knows.”¹² He employs three strategies that make contextualization work: 1) He speaks in a situational dialect with simple diction; 2) he engages with local leaders; and 3) he repeats choice words selected for resonance.

First, he speaks with a situational dialect “immediately identify[ing] the

speaker as one who belongs,” simultaneously contradicting his natural speech inflection.¹³ Although Obama was born in Hawaii and has been a Chicago resident since 1985, he declares with a clear Black Southern Baptist accent, “Something happened when a bunch of women decided they were going to walk instead of ride the bus.” Yet, a few moments later, he states “we’re not observing the ideals set forth in our Constitution”, clearly lacking the accent he used a few moments earlier. Senator Obama even drawls in a halting rhythm reminiscent of the dialect in Alabama. He says, “I was mentioning at the Unity Breakfast this morning, my...,” followed by a long pause where his voice becomes exceptionally Southern, “...at the Unity Breakfast this morning,”¹⁴ wherein he matches the rhythm and tempo of the situational dialect and repeats himself.¹⁵ These inconsistencies abound in his speech, illustrating conscious attempts to frame the situation as high-context.

He also “speaks in simple language”¹⁶ in an effort to employ a more familiar vocabulary, emulating the speech of his audience. For example, he declares, “Don’t tell me it doesn’t have to do with the fact that we got too many daddies not acting like daddies,”¹⁷ to build trust that he is a member of the community. Obama purposely and methodically strives to gain his audience’s support using this tactic of contextualization.

Second, he frequently references local leaders who “control the opinion of their publics”¹⁸ as “a means of reaching the larger public.”¹⁹ Obama mentions local reverends and other community leaders to integrate himself into the family atmosphere of the church. Listing his associations “demonstrate[s] that he has a large and influential constituency”²⁰ and proves that he understands that local leaders are the “key figure(s) in the molding of public opinion.”²¹ Thus, this tactic serves “as a shortcut to understanding and action” by surreptitiously engineering consent.²² He builds credibility, and accrues the affinity that comes with being a member of the Church.

Third, Obama weaves in words that

resonate predictably with his audience. As he presides over the *Voting Rights Commemoration*, he consistently restates the words the “march” and the “journey” and continuously repeats the phrase “because they marched.” For the same reasons, because he is in church, he references the Bible to demonstrate his morals and principles are one with his audience. He repeats Joshua’s name an extraordinary twenty times and the word “prayer” seven times. He also speaks often of challenging “the Pharaoh, the princes, powers.”²³ Obama liberally references religion because “If a proposition is backed by some weighty authority, like the Bible, or can be associated with a great name, people may be expected to respond to it in accordance with the veneration they have for these sources.”²⁴ Restating the principles of an audience provokes attention to the speaker’s commonalities with the people. True political analysis of the speaker’s message is lost in rhetorical flourishes. In this case, the audience sees the speaker as a virtual participant in the original Voting Rights March and a virtual member of the audience’s Church, who understands exactly his listeners’ feelings and history. In this light, the audience no longer sees him as a professional politician—Obama has gained their consent.

Basic Political Themes

Obama repeats the most basic political themes of self-preservation, ambition, threat and reassurance – rhetorical devices commonly associated with the insider politician.²⁵ Obama expresses the first theme, “Materialism alone will not fulfill the possibilities of your existence. You have to fill that with something else.”²⁶ Next, Obama speaks of ambition: “I’m fighting to make sure that our schools are adequately funded all across the country.”²⁷

The most telling sign occurs when the politician “talks about the perennial threats faced by any audience, and then about the way in which he will deliver them from the threats.”²⁸ Obama exemplifies the

final themes of threat and reassurance when he states, “I’m not sure, I’m not sure that I’m up to the challenge.” He next implores, “be strong and have courage, for I am with you wherever you go...when you see row and row of state troopers facing you and the horses and tear gas...be strong and have courage, for I am with you wherever you go.”²⁹ Again, he then speaks of “doubts and fears...in the face of skepticism, in the face of cynicism”³⁰ when he replies, “Be strong and have courage and let us cross over that Promised Land together.”³¹ The threats in this case are the state troopers, the doubts and fears. His call for people to “be strong and have courage” is the reassurance.

Obama extensively repeats these political themes to demonstrate the “endless spectacle of threat and assurance in which political actors try to assert order in ways calculated to impress their audience with their heroism, devotion, sincerity, dexterity and other laudable qualities.”³² Insider politicians use these themes to elevate the tone of their rhetoric so the audience will think highly of the politician and see him as their leader.

The Pseudo-Image

Obama’s outsider image gains strength and legitimacy in the pseudo-event where “participants are selected for their newsworthy and dramatic interest.”³³ Obama’s attendance at the Commemoration, its 46th anniversary (2007), is a less dramatic event to attend than its 45th or 50th anniversary. At the event, Obama equates himself and his existence with the Selma March: “There was something coming across the country because of what happened in Selma, Alabama, because folks are willing to make it across a bridge, so they got together and Barack Obama was born.”³⁴ Yet, Obama was born in 1961, four years prior to the March. He makes a conscious effort to tailor this event to his meticulously crafted image.

In this manner, the insider politician, cloaked in the appealing mantle of the outsider, takes advantage of the fact “that for

the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define first and then see.”³⁵ A politician can easily repeat and tailor these strategies to new situations. Obama is just one of many politicians who apply this method. The strategy is a fake, a ploy—it is an “image” that hides reality, demonstrating how well engineering consent works within America without anyone noticing.

Why Engineering Consent Works

Since its founding, American society has attempted to obtain any kind of consensus, however false (i.e. the outsider image) or impossible. Voters must trust politicians because there is a “need for interposing some form of expertness between the private citizen and the vast environment in which he is entangled.”³⁶ There is often no other choice. American society demands this distilled reality and it sometimes must be “taken for truth because the fiction is badly needed.”³⁷ It is comfortable not to reevaluate these ‘truths’ because they “preserve us from all the bewildering effect of trying to see the world steadily and see it whole.”³⁸ Many voters survive quite well without reminders that elites manipulate their voting impulses.

Americans need the image of the outsider because they “suffer from extravagant expectations.”³⁹ Americans do not want to see the truth behind the false consensus created by politicians because it is comfortable not to, and because it ‘works.’ As long as voters feel secure that the man they elect is not like all other politicians, and that he actually represents their concerns and interests, then they are pleased the system works.

However, below the surface, it is a fact that politicians create various images for various audiences to engineer consent. Thus, insider politicians, like Barack Obama, can enlarge their political constituency in spite of an imprecise message that may appear on first glance that he ‘represent [s] their concerns and interests.’

American voters need someone with Obama’s mythical outsider “image,” however false or engineered, because it is far easier to

judge a book by its cover. Obama could be the 'new kid on the block,' or he could be like every other professional politician in America. The possibility of the latter is simply too

daunting and disturbing for the average American voter to think about. For many Americans, it is easier to believe that change is possible.

Endnotes

- ¹ Walter Lippmann, Phantom Public (New Jersey: Transaction Publishers, 1993) XLIV.
- ² Daniel J. Boorstin, The Image: A Guide to Pseudo-Events in America (New York: Vintage Books, 1992) 39.
- ³ Author's own definition, gleaned from works of Doris Graber and Walter Lippmann
- ⁴ Around the time of 2000, with the election of George W. Bush, who portrayed himself as an outsider.
- ⁵ Edward L. Bernays, Public Relations (New York: Horace Liveright, 1928) 158.
- ⁶ Richard Weaver, Language is Sermonic (Louisiana: Louisiana State University Press, 1985) 208.
- ⁷ Weaver 209.
- ⁸ Lippmann, Phantom Public 278.
- ⁹ Definition attributed to Edward T. Hall, *Beyond Culture*
- ¹⁰ Definition attributed to Edward T. Hall, *Beyond Culture*
- ¹¹ Edward T. Hall, Beyond Culture (New York: Knopf Publishing Group, 1977) 113.
- ¹² Hall 132.
- ¹³ Hall 132.
- ¹⁴ Barack Obama, address, [Selma Voting Rights March Commemoration](#), Brown Chapel, Selma, 4 Mar. 2007.
- ¹⁵ Please refer to http://youtube.com/watch?v=9r-XG_VJZDw and contrast with any other video appearance by Obama in northern States and/or interviews with news stations.
- ¹⁶ Edward L. Bernays *Propaganda*, p. 105.
- ¹⁷ Obama.
- ¹⁸ Bernays, Propaganda 105.
- ¹⁹ Bernays, Public Relations 164.
- ²⁰ Doris Graber, Verbal Behavior and Politics (Chicago: University of Illinois College Press, 1976) 176.
- ²¹ Bernays, Public Relations 164.
- ²² Bernays, Public Relations 166.
- ²³ Obama.
- ²⁴ Weaver 210.
- ²⁵ Bernays, Public Relations 166.
- ²⁶ Obama.
- ²⁷ Obama.
- ²⁸ Graber 185.
- ²⁹ Obama.
- ³⁰ Obama.
- ³¹ Obama.
- ³² Graber 188.
- ³³ Boorstin 39.
- ³⁴ Obama.

³⁵ Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (New York: Free Press Paperbacks, 1997) 29.

³⁶ Lippmann, Public Opinion 239.

³⁷ Lippmann, Public Opinion 12.

³⁸ Lippmann, Public Opinion 75.

³⁹ Boorstin 39.



PEPPERDINE
POLICY REVIEW

**School of Public Policy
Pepperdine University
24255 Pacific Coast Highway
Malibu, CA 90263-7490
phone: (310) 506-7490**

pepperdinepolicyreview@gmail.com

<http://publicpolicy.pepperdine.edu/policy-review/>

©2008 Pepperdine University, School of Public Policy